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     DISTRIBUTIONAL ARGUMENTS, IN REVERSE 
Alex Raskolnikov† 
 
What should the government do about the distribution 
of resources and outcomes in the society? Two arguments 
have shaped academic debates about this question for 
several decades. The first argument states that economic 
regulation should focus on efficiency alone, leaving 
distributional considerations for the tax-and-transfer 
system. The second argument objects to government 
assistance for people unintentionally harmed by legal 
reforms. Taken together, the two arguments impose major 
restrictions on the range of possible distributional policies. 
This Article contends that a growing body of research 
in the economics of trade, immigration, industrial 
organization, labor, and environmental regulation reveals 
that the core assumptions underlying the two distributional 
arguments do not hold. Moreover, once these assumptions 
are changed to reflect reality, the analytical machinery 
underlying the arguments goes in reverse: The conclusions 
become not merely indeterminate but opposite of those 
originally advanced. The revised distributional arguments 
support enacting a broad-based transitional assistance 
program for low-skill workers, embracing some 
distributionally informed legal rules, and replacing our 
complex, obscure, state-specific social safety net with a 
simpler, transparent, nationally uniform one. More 
generally, reversing the normative thrust of the two 
distributional arguments shifts the focus of the academic 
inquiry. Instead of debating whether the government should 
actively shape distributional outcomes in a variety of ways, 
the question becomes how should the government do so 
given institutional, informational, and political constraints. 
Finding and refining answers to this question would help 
policymakers to craft better policy responses to major 
economic shocks, whether these shocks arise from legal 
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Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most 
seductive, and in my opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on questions 
of distribution.  
Robert Lucas, Nobel Laureate in Economics1 
Marie Antoinette said, “Let them eat cake.” But history records no 
transfer of sugar and flour to her peasant subjects. 
Paul Samuelson, Nobel Laureate in Economics2 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 9, 1993, less than two weeks before the pivotal 
congressional vote that would decide the fate of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Vice President Al Gore was on Larry King 
Live—the most watched show in CNN history.3 That night, the show had 
its largest audience ever. Over eleven million viewers tuned in to watch 
Gore debate NAFTA with the 1990’s version of a flamboyant-
billionaire-turned-protectionist-presidential-aspirant H. Ross Perot.4 
Naturally, the two debaters disagreed. 
Perot warned Americans about the “giant sucking sound” that they 
would hear if NAFTA passed,5 as almost six million jobs would move 
south of the border.6 He was not alone in his concerns. Trade unions 
                                                      
1  Robert E. Lucas, Jr. The Industrial Revolution: Past and Future, 44 ECON. 
ED. BULLETIN 1, 8 (2004). 
2  Paul A. Samuelson, Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm 
Arguments of Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization, 18 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 135, 144 (2004).  To be fair to Lucas, he concludes the paragraph that 
starts with the quoted sentence by saying : “The potential for improving the lives 
of poor people by finding different ways of distributing current production is 
nothing compared to the apparently limitless potential of increasing production.”  
Lucas, supra note 1, at 8 (emphasis in original).  Be it as it may, Marie 
Antoinette lost her head. 
3 Larry King Live: NAFTA Debate–Gore vs. Perot (transcript of CNN 
television broadcast, Nov. 9, 1993), 
https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3
TD9-1900-0029-54DJ-00000-00&context=1516831 (hereinafter, CNN Debate). 
For the viewing statistics of the show, see Larry King Live, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Larry_King_Live (last visited Jan 7, 2020). 
4 Id. 
5 Eduardo Porter, Ross Perot’s Warning of a “Giant Sucking Sound” on 
Nafta Echoes Today, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/09/business/economy/ross-perot-nafta-
trade.html. 
6 See ROSS PEROT & PAT CHOATE, SAVE YOUR JOB, SAVE OUR COUNTRY: 
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opposed the agreement as well, worried about large losses of American 
jobs.7 
But Gore had a completely different view. Not only NAFTA would 
not cost American workers, he argued, it would bring 200,000 new jobs 
to the United States.8 There would not be even an initial “dip” in U.S. 
employment, he reassured the viewing public. Perrot and the unions were 
wrong. 
As the NAFTA debate raged on, the non-partisan Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) reviewed nineteen forecasts of the NAFTA’s 
economic impact. Whatever the uncertainties, the CBO concluded, the 
“models estimate that NAFTA would have little effect on the vast 
majority of major industries in the United States, and that even the 
largest of these effects would be surprisingly small.”9 Gore, it appeared, 
had the better argument. 
Congress approved NAFTA on November 20, 1993, with more than 
half of the representatives of Gore’s own party voting against it.10 In the 
two decades that followed, congressional majorities and presidential 
administrations acted as if the CBO had perfect foresight. Although 
advocates continued to sound alarms,11 policymakers remained unmoved. 
They offered no meaningful transitional assistance to workers affected 
by NAFTA and the China’s accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) that followed a decade later with U.S. acquiescence. They did not 
modify the social safety net to help American workers absorb the 
                                                                                                                         
WHY NAFTA MUST BE STOPPED—NOW! 52-54 (1993). See also, White House 
Briefing, Sept 15, 1993, 1993 WL 366308 (explaining that Perot’s claim 
implies—incredibly—that by absorbing 5.9 million U.S. jobs Mexico would 
double its GNP). 
7 See EDWARD ALDEN, FAILURE TO ADJUST: HOW AMERICANS GOT LEFT 
BEHIND IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 82 (2017). 
8 See CNN Debate, supra note 3. 
9 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF NAFTA: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC MODELS AND OTHER EMPIRICAL STUDIES 61 
(1993), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/103rd-congress-1993-
1994/reports/93doc154.pdf. 
10 See ALDEN, supra note 7, at 22. 
11 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott et al., Revisiting NAFTA: Still Not Working for 
North America’s Workers, EPI Briefing Paper No.173 (Sept. 28, 2006), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/bp173/; Robert E. Scott, Heading South, U.S.-
Mexico Trade and Job Displacement After NAFTA, EPI Briefing Paper No. 308 
(May 3, 2011), https://www.epi.org/publication/heading_south_u-s-
mexico_trade_and_job_displacement_after_nafta1/. 
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economic shocks of trade liberalization. They did not slow the pace of 
that liberalization to enable experts to better assess the resulting 
distributional impacts. And experts themselves remained uninterested in 
checking whether the CBO’s prediction of “surprisingly small” adverse 
economic impacts would turn out to be true (it did not).12  
A similar story may be told about the evolution of U.S. competition 
policy, immigration policy, labor policy, and environmental policy 
during the same period. All these policies, we are now learning, gave rise 
to large, unintended distributional burdens that were missed by 
academics and ignored by policymakers again and again. 
The consequences of these decisions have upended American 
politics and will continue to do so in years to come. The causes of these 
decisions are numerous and complex. But the intellectual foundation of 
these decisions is clear. And it is this foundation—or at least its key 
elements—that are the focus on this Article. 
Over the past several decades, two influential arguments have 
dominated academic debates about the proper scope of government 
distributional policies. The first argument posits that efficiency should be 
the only concern of economic regulation. This “efficiency-only 
argument” urges the government to ignore distributional considerations 
in the design of legal rules. Distribution, the argument concludes, should 
be addressed through the tax-and-transfer system alone.13 
                                                      
12 This is particularly true of academic experts. On NAFTA’s ten-year 
anniversary, the Congressional Research Service reviewed “numerous 
evaluations” of the economic effects of NAFTA. Not a single evaluation was 
performed by an academic economist or published in a peer reviewed journal. 
The evaluations mostly reaffirmed the 1993 consensus about the small economic 
impact of NAFTA, though Carnegie Foundation report did discuss the need for 
trade adjustment assistance and a possible need for a larger social safety net. J.F. 
Hornbeck, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21737, NAFTA at Ten: Lessons from 
Recent Studies 2 (2017), 
https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc824515/. 
13 The key statements of this argument are Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 
Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing 
Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) and Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency 
vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity 
Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 AM. ECON. ASS’N PAPERS & PROC. 
414 (1981). For an earlier expression of the same idea, see Aanund Hylland & 
Richard Zeckhauser, Distributional Objectives Should Affect Taxes but Not 
Program Choice or Design, 81 SCAND. J. ECON. 264 (1979). For a later 
contribution, see David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to 
Redistribute Income?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (2003). The economic model on 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3692798
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The second argument resists government compensation for those 
unintentionally harmed by new or changing government programs. 
Private markets do a better job of protecting people from foreseeable 
risks than the government ever could, this “no-compensation argument” 
explains.14 Besides, if the government does try to compensate unintended 
losers, the resulting effort is bound to be arbitrary, unfair, and ultimately 
unsustainable.15 
Taken together, the two arguments urge a decidedly limited 
government involvement in the distribution of economic resources and 
outcomes in the society. To be clear, the arguments do not oppose all 
such involvement. But they do limit it to certain occasions (generally 
excluding losses from legal transitions) and certain forms (generally the 
tax-and-transfer system alone).16 
This Article contends that the government should consider—rather 
than ignore—distributional consequences both in the design of legal 
rules and during legal transitions. This does not mean that the 
distributional effect of every legal rule should be measured and taken 
into account in the rule’s design. But if the likely distributional effects 
are unintended, large, and objectionable, if the efficiency of the legal rule 
is doubtful, if the compensating tax-and-transfer adjustment is not 
forthcoming (or has not occurred), policymakers should take distribution 
into account. One way of doing so is to choose among several alternative 
legal rules of questionable efficiency the one with better distributional 
consequences.  Another is to slow the pace of legal change in certain 
cases. 
Nor does the Article suggest that every transitional loss should be 
reimbursed. But if losses are large and unforeseeable, if private risk-
mitigation mechanisms are unavailable, the government should step in. 
Enacting a broad-based transitional assistance program for low-skill 
workers and replacing our complex, obscure, state-specific social safety 
                                                                                                                         
which the argument rests comes from Anthony B. Atkinson & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
The Design of Tax Structure: Direct versus Indirect Taxation, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 
55 (1976). 
14 The key articulation of this claim is Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis 
of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 535 (1986). 
15 An early—and possibly the original—explication of this point is Clair 
Wilcox, Relief for Victims of Tariff Cuts, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 884 (1950). 
16 This brief summary of the two arguments presents their strong, generally 
recognized version. For a discussion of qualifications and caveats see infra, text 
accompanying notes 39-47; 54-60. 
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net with simpler, transparent, nationally uniform one would go a long 
way toward mitigating the losses discussed here. 
This Article is not the first one to challenge the two influential 
distributional arguments.17 But none of the previous counters took 
account of the large body of emerging research in the economics of 
trade, labor, immigration, industrial organization, and regulation. The 
                                                      
17 For the counters to the efficiency-only argument, see, e.g., Tomer 
Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth, On the Limits of Redistributive Taxation: 
Establishing a Case for Equity-Informed Legal Rules, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1, 3 
(2005) (discussing the effect of administrative costs and egalitarian preferences 
on the choice of distributional instruments); Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. 
McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics, 100 Minn. L. Rev. 
1051 (2014) (arguing that political impediments to offsetting distributive 
adjustments defeat the unequivocal prescription of the efficiency-only 
argument); Zachary Liscow, Note, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When 
Legal Rule Design Should Incorporate Equity as Well as Efficiency, 123 YALE 
L.J. 2478 (2014) (arguing that legal rules may be more efficient than tax-and-
transfer system in reducing inequality in certain circumstances); Kyle Logue & 
Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and 
Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157, 167-68 (2003) (drawing attention to non-
income sources of inequality as a reason to account for distributional 
consequences in designing legal rules); Richard L. Revesz, Regulation and 
Distribution, N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1489 (2018) (arguing in favor of a standing 
interagency regulatory body to address undesirable distributional effects of legal 
rules); Chris W. Sanchirico, Taxes versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: 
A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 797, 798 (2000) (arguing that possible 
unobserved within-income group heterogeneity should lead to distributionally 
informed legal rules). For examples of objections to the no-compensation 
argument, see, e.g., Michael Doran, Legislative Compromise and Tax Transition 
Policy, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 545 (2007) (arguing that by binding itself to 
either always or never compensating transitional losses the legislature reduces 
its ability to compromise on future legislation); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and 
Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1090-91 
(1997) (pointing out that market insurance may be unavailable in particular 
cases and that public cost of retroactive lawmaking may be unacceptably high); 
Daniel S. Goldberg, Tax Subsidies: One-time vs Periodic An Economic Analysis 
of the Tax Policy Alternatives, 49 TAX L. REV 305, 328-30 (1994) (suggesting 
that committing to transition relief reduces investment uncertainty and 
administrative and operational costs of legislation); Kyle Logue, Tax 
Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government 
Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (1996) (contesting the no-compensation 
argument as applied to incentive subsidies while analogizing them to 
government contracts); Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions 
and the Protection Racket: A Reply to Professors Graetz and Kaplow, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 1155 (1989) (explaining why the no-compensation rule would—and 
does—give rise to rent-seeking). 
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economists’ findings are so recent that, to the best of my knowledge, no 
one has used them to reassess the two arguments. This Article undertakes 
such reassessment and reaches a stark conclusion: the assumptions 
underlying both arguments—not just some assumptions, but key 
assumptions—falter when compared to actual outcomes, either in general 
or in a large and important set of cases. Moreover, once these 
assumptions are changed to reflect reality, the policy prescriptions 
resulting from the two arguments do not merely become indeterminate. 
Rather, the analytical machinery underlying the arguments goes in 
reverse—the policy prescriptions become the opposite of the original 
ones. 
The efficiency-only argument assumes that distributional 
adjustments take place in the tax-and-transfer system, at least “in 
response to changes in legal rules whenever these changes resulted in a 
‘sufficiently important’ shift in the distribution of income.’”18 It is 
becoming increasingly clear that over the past several decades, a range of 
government policies gave rise to such distributional shifts. These policies 
unintentionally imposed large losses on a specific group of Americans 
consisting of low-skill, low-education, pre-retirement age workers. Yet 
the U.S. government has enacted no significant programs aimed at 
offsetting or mitigating these losses.19 The assumed tax-and-transfer 
adjustments never materialized.  
Moreover, the efficiency-only argument stresses the importance of 
designing legal rules to achieve economic efficiency. But recent research 
raises serious doubts about the efficiency of actual legal rules, and even 
entire legal regimes. There is growing evidence of multiple market 
failures: monopoly power in product markets, monopsony power in labor 
markets, and possible anticompetitive behavior in capital markets as 
well.20 Law-and-economics scholars are increasingly skeptical about the 
efficiency of the common law.21 If the assumption that real-world legal 
rules are at least roughly efficient is implausible, it becomes difficult to 
argue for sacrificing real-world distributional concerns for the sake of 
hypothetical efficiency. 
                                                      
18 Shavell, supra note 13, at 417 (quotes in original). 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 228-231 explaining why the Affordable 
Care Act and the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit cannot be 
plausibly viewed as such compensating adjustments. 
20 For a discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 175-210. 
21 For a discussion, see infra text accompanying note 211. 
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Furthermore, it is well-understood that the choice between legal rules 
and the tax-and-transfer system becomes complicated if there is 
unobserved heterogeneity among people in the same income group. So 
only if one assumes that such heterogeneity does not exist (or is not 
important) does the efficiency-only argument’s ultimate prescription 
retain its full force. It turns out, however, that unobserved heterogeneity 
does exist within the group of low-skill American workers. Although less 
consequential than the failure of the first two assumptions, this 
heterogeneity adds another reason to reconsider the efficiency-only 
argument. 
Turning to the no-compensation argument reveals a similar 
disconnect between assumptions and reality. The argument urges no 
government relief for unintended losers from changes in government 
policies. In its general form, this argument relies on two assumptions. 
First, private actors can anticipate future legal changes. Second, actors 
can insure against those changes either by buying private insurance or by 
diversifying in financial markets. 
No doubt, some changes may be anticipated, private insurance may 
be available, and diversification may be a realistic possibility. But for 
those affected by the changes in U.S. trade, competition, labor, and other 
policies discussed in this Article, none of this is true. Economists are 
surprised by the magnitude and concentration of negative shocks from 
trade liberalization, labor market monopsonization, and other recent 
policies—shocks that they are discovering only now. Given that experts 
failed to anticipate these shocks, American workers who suffered them 
could hardly be expected to have had greater foresight. Financial 
diversification is of no help for these workers either, and no private 
insurance is available. Large, unanticipated, privately uninsurable and 
undiversifiable losses of labor income are the classic reason for social 
insurance, whether these losses result from legal changes or not.22 So the 
no-compensation argument’s own logic points toward the need for 
government assistance for those who suffer these losses. 
                                                      
22 See Raj Chetty & Amy Finkelstein, Social Insurance: Connecting Theory 
to Data, in 5 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 111, 134, 141 (Alan J. 
Auerbach et al. eds., 2013); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE 
SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 26-27 (1999); Alan B. 
Krueger & Bruce D. Meyer, Labor Supply Effects of Social Insurance, in 4 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 2327, 2330 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin 
Feldstein eds., 2002). 
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A narrower version of the same argument rejects targeted 
government assistance even when the factual assumptions underlying the 
broad version do not hold. Even if government compensation is a good 
idea in theory, this narrower version states, it cannot be implemented in 
practice without relying on arbitrary distinctions.23 
This implementation critique assumes the need for arbitrary line 
drawing. That assumption has been plausible for decades as the only 
significant U.S. transitional assistance policy has been the Trade 
Adjustment Assistance Program (TAA).24 But the TAA’s reliance on 
distinctions is irrelevant today. Economists are discovering that it was 
not only U.S. trade policy that unintentionally harmed low-skill 
American workers. Widespread labor market monopsony resulting from 
weak enforcement of U.S. competition laws likely harmed these workers 
as well. The same is likely true of the U.S. labor policy, environmental 
policy, and federal government’s acquiescence in proliferation of state 
licensing requirements and local zoning regulation. Given these findings, 
the targeted adjustment assistance program needed today would require 
much less targeting compared to the TAA. Rather than separating 
workers harmed by free trade from those harmed by labor market 
monopsony, automation, poor management, and so on, this program 
would target low-skill workers as a group. Such broad targeting would 
not suffer from the arbitrariness that bedeviled the TAA for half a 
century. 
Considering U.S. social insurance in light of recent empirical 
findings brings more reasons for concern. These findings highlight a 
major, previously unappreciated flaw of U.S. distributional policies. It is 
no secret that U.S. social safety net is highly location-specific. Welfare,25 
unemployment insurance,26 health insurance,27 and nutritional 
                                                      
23 See Wilcox, supra note 15. 
24 See J.F. Hornbeck, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41922, TRADE ADJUSTMENT 
ASSISTANCE (TAA) AND ITS ROLE IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 2 (2017), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41922.pdf. 
25 See Gene Falk, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32748, THE TEMPORARY 
ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) BLOCK GRANT: A PRIMER ON TANF 
FINANCING AND FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS 5-8 (2017), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32748.pdf; David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal 
Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2547 (2005). 
26 See Julie M. Whittaker & Katelin P. Isaacs, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL33362, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: PROGRAMS AND BENEFITS 2-4 (2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33362.pdf; JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE 
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assistance28 vary greatly from state to state. Academics have supported 
this variation by pointing out the benefits of experimentation, local 
accountability, sensitivity to variations in the cost of living, and 
responsiveness to taxpayers’ heterogeneous preferences for amenities.29 
But even if the implicit assumption that all these benefits outweigh 
the costs of geographic variation has been plausible until recently, it has 
become much less plausible today. New research reveals that economic 
shocks resulting from trade liberalization, low-skill immigration, and 
labor market monopsony are highly local. Moreover, when these shocks 
occur, labor market adjustments are both difficult and slow. Adjustment 
costs that economists assumed away and politicians ignored turned out to 
be a major burden. 
These adjustment costs are not inevitable. The federal government 
can reduce them in two ways. It can lower the artificial, state-imposed 
barriers to geographic mobility. And it can replace the current complex, 
obscure, state-specific income assistance programs with simpler, 
transparent, nationally uniform ones. 
Give the Article’s conclusions, neither policy experts nor 
policymakers should feel constrained by the standard prescriptions of the 
efficiency-only and no-compensation arguments. Instead, they should 
consider the types of policies that follow logically from replacing the 
unrealistic assumptions underlying both arguments with plausible ones. 
These takeaways are sure to give rise to objections. The Article considers 
three important ones. 
The first objection is that distributional adjustments advocated here 
are uniquely challenging because measuring unintended distributional 
impacts of government policies is difficult. More difficult, in particular, 
than forecasting future changes in employment, inflation, revenues, and 
other key economic indicators that routinely affect government policies. 
                                                                                                                         
AND PUBLIC POLICY 385 (2007). 
27 See Alison Mitchell, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN FOCUS: OVERVIEW OF 
THE ACA MEDICAID EXPANSION (DEC. 3, 2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10399.pdf. 
28 See Randy Alison Aussenberg, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL42505., 
SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP): A PRIMER ON 
ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFITS 9-12 (2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42505.pdf. 
29 See Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy 
Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1335-37 
(2009); Super, supra note 25, at 2552-60.  
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This objection is factually correct. Distributional projections do, 
indeed, require more information than forecasts of the standard economic 
indicators. But greater informational demands do not justify inaction. 
Our government makes important choices lacking full information about 
key economic indicators all the time. These predictions have turned out 
to be wrong again and again. Yet Congress, the Federal Reserve, and 
other government actors continue to make decisions faced with uncertain 
projections, adjusting policy when forecasts turn out to be mistaken. 
Policymakers should follow the same approach when it comes to 
distributional adjustments. 
The second objection is that distributional impacts take too long to 
reveal themselves. Too long, that is, for the government to be able to 
respond effectively as these impacts unfold. 
Recent evidence appears to support this objection, yet it in fact the 
opposite conclusion emerges from data. Economists are discovering only 
now the effects of trade shocks that occurred two decades ago and the 
consequences of changes in the U.S. product and labor markets that took 
even longer to develop. But the same new research reveals that the 
reason for these delayed findings is that, to put it bluntly, “it took a while 
for academics to catch up.”30 Many long-term trends were visible in the 
data at least a decade—and in some cases decades—ago. Paying more 
attention to these and similar trends going forward would allow 
policymakers to respond to unintended distributional impacts much more 
promptly. 
Third, the call for lowering state-imposed barriers to entry and for a 
greater uniformity of federal safety net programs runs head-on into fiscal 
federalism concerns. The Article’s response is straightforward. We now 
know about large costs of geographic immobility. These costs are borne 
by Americans who are ill-equipped to avoid or absorb them. Whatever 
the balance between federal and local provision of social insurance and 
public assistance has been until now, new evidence surely weighs in 
favor of greater centralization and uniformity. 
The Article’s arguments unfold in five main parts. Part II summarizes 
the two distributional arguments and highlights their key assumptions. 
Part III demonstrates that over the past several decades, numerous major 
                                                      
30 Nelson D. Schwartz & Quoctrung Bui, Where Jobs Are Squeezed by 
Chinese Trade, Voters Seek Extremes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2016), 
https://nyti.ms/1Ta9XDj. 
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U.S. policies likely imposed large, concentrated burdens on low-skill 
American workers without aiming to do so. Part IV argues that the U.S. 
government largely ignored these new burdens. Part V evaluates the 
assumptions underlying the two distributional arguments in light of the 
evidence discussed in Parts III and IV, finding that the assumptions are 
contradicted by major economic developments of the past several 
decades. Part VI suggests several directions for policy reform, and Part 
VII addresses likely counterarguments. The Conclusions emphasizes the 
general implications of the Article’s analysis. Reversing the normative 
thrust of the two distributional arguments shifts the focus of the 
academic inquiry. Instead of debating whether the government should 
actively shape distributional outcomes in a variety of ways, the question 
becomes how should the government do so given institutional, 
informational, and political constraints. Finding and refining answers to 
this question would help policymakers craft better policy responses to 
economic shocks, whether these shocks arise from legal reforms, 
technological transformations, or a global pandemic. 
II. DISTRIBUTIONAL ARGUMENTS AND THEIR ASSUMPTIONS 
The close connection between general government programs and the 
government’s distributional policies is not a recent discovery. Two 
millennia ago Juvenal berated Roman rulers for using bread and circuses 
to compensate for poor governance.31 More recently, law-and-economics 
scholars advanced two arguments about the interaction of legal rules and 
distributional policies. The first one limits distributional policies to the 
tax-and-transfer system. The second one urges policymakers to ignore 
losses from legal transitions. Both arguments are powerful, compelling, 
and highly influential.32 And both rely on assumptions, as all theories do. 
                                                      
31 See Bread and Circuses, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bread_and_circuses. 
32 See, e.g., Blumkin & Margalioth, supra note 17, at 2 (referring to the 
efficiency-only argument as “the prevailing norm in the law and economics 
literature”); Tsilly Dagan, The Global Market for Tax and Legal Rules, 21 FLA. 
TAX REV. 148, 151-52 (2017) (describing the efficiency-only argument as a 
“canonical claim”); Matthew Dimick, The Law and Economics of 
Redistribution, 15 ANNUAL REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 559, 560 (2019) (calling 
Kaplow and Shavell’s article articulating the efficiency-only argument 
“seminal—and, for many—debate concluding”); Zachary D. Liscow, Are Court 
Orders Sticky? Evidence on Distributional Outcomes from School Finance, 15 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 4, 4 (2018) (referring to the efficiency-only argument 
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This Part presents the two arguments and their key assumptions in order 
to re-examine them in light of recent evidence later on. 
A. The Efficiency-Only Argument 
In the words of its main proponents Louis Kaplow and Steven 
Shavell, the efficiency-only argument states that “legal rules should not 
be adjusted to disfavor the rich and favor the poor in order to redistribute 
income, because the income tax and transfer system is a more efficient 
means of redistribution.”33 The argument begins by noting that in 
general, any given distributional objective may be accomplished by 
changing either legal rules (understood broadly as any rule “other than 
those that define the income tax and welfare system”34) or tax rules 
(understood as all rules that do define the tax and welfare system). But 
any transfer from the rich to the poor distorts incentives to earn income. 
When this transfer is carried out through the tax-and-transfer system, this 
distortion gives rise to the standard deadweight loss of taxation. What the 
efficiency-only argument adds is the insight that if the same transfer is 
accomplished through a legal rule rather a tax rule, the same distortion 
gives rise to the same deadweight loss. But in addition, embedding 
redistribution in legal rules “also creates inefficiencies in the activities 
regulated by the legal rules.”35 
In other words, shifting distributional adjustments from the tax 
system to the legal system does nothing to reduce the efficiency cost of 
redistribution but adds a new costly distortion. So nothing is gained but 
some efficiency is lost when legal, rather than tax, rules are altered to 
reflect distributional concerns. 
                                                                                                                         
as the “traditional economic analysis of legal rules”); Logue & Avraham, supra 
note 17, at 158 (“we believe that it is safe to say that a majority of legal 
economists hold the … view” that the efficiency-only argument is correct); 
Masur & Nash, supra note 62, at 394 (“For many years, the traditional law and 
economics literature advocated strongly against legal transition relief.”); Revesz, 
supra note 17, at 1510-11 (demonstrating the influence of the efficiency-only 
argument in legal academy); Sanchirico, supra note 17, at 798 (referring to the 
“broad consensus within law and economics that legal rules should be set solely 
on the basis of efficiency”). 
33 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? 
Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 
29 J. LEG. STUD. 821, 821 (2000). 
34 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 13, at 667 n.1. 
35 Id. at 668. 
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Importantly, the efficiency-only argument is not an argument against 
redistribution. Rather it is an argument against a particular form of 
redistribution. As Shavell noted in his original presentation of the 
argument, 
[O]ne’s attitude toward the result under discussion 
will depend on his expectation that the income tax would 
be (or could be) altered in response to changes in legal 
rules whenever these changes resulted in a “sufficiently 
important” shift in the distribution of income.36  
If we gloss over the difference between “would be” and “could be” in the 
quoted passage, Shavell conditions the normative takeaway from the 
efficiency-only argument on the expectation about the offsetting tax-and-
transfer adjustment.37 Similarly, David Weisbach explains that he 
supports the efficiency-only argument 
not out of lack of concern for distribution or equality, 
[but because] there is a better method of addressing these 
concerns. … We should, therefore, use the tax system 
rather than legal rules to address income inequality, and, 
correspondingly, legal rules should not systematically 
favor the poor.38 
These statements—as well as the overall logic of the efficiency-only 
argument—demonstrate that the assumption about the tax-and-transfer 
system adjustment carries a lot of weight. So much weight, in fact, that if 
the assumption is reversed, the conclusion must be reversed as well. If 
tax rules do not take distribution into account, or fail to do so adequately, 
then legal rules should reflect distributional considerations at least in 
some cases.39 After all, the argument’s proponents support redistributive 
                                                      
36 Shavell, supra note 13 at 417 (quotes in the original). 
37 Glossing over this difference treats the argument charitably. Writing later 
jointly with Kaplow, Shavell explains that the critique of the efficiency-only 
argument “would be moot if the income tax system … could be used freely” to 
redistribute. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 13, at 667 (emphasis supplied). I 
believe that if Kaplow and Shavell knew for certain that redistribution through 
the tax system is possible (could happen) but is never done, they would not 
insist on ignoring distributional issues in the design of legal rules. 
38 Weisbach, supra note 13, at 439.  
39 Weisbach does not go quite as far, but he does conclude that “[w]ithout the 
tax system, [the efficiency-only argument’s] conclusion would not necessarily 
hold and legal rules might optimally be set to redistribute.” Id. at 439-40. 
Weisbach’s use of “might” may be a stylistic choice rather than substantive 
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transfers. If these transfers cannot be carried out through the tax system, 
the only alternative is to redistribute through the legal system, imperfect 
as it may be for accomplishing distributive goals. 
The efficiency-only argument’s another important assumption is 
about the efficiency of legal rules. Various articulations of the argument 
differ significantly in the importance of that assumption. A weaker 
version states that “any regime with an inefficient legal rule can be 
replaced by a regime with an efficient legal rule and a modified income 
tax system designed so that every person is made better off.”40 This is a 
statement about possibilities. Hypothetical efficiency of hypothetical 
rules is achieved by an imaginary change in the tax system. 
Other versions, however, are much more assertive. “[R]edistribution 
through legal rules offers no advantage over redistribution through the 
income tax system and typically is less efficient.”41 “[L]egal rules should 
not be designed to redistribute to the poor … [because] there is a better 
method of addressing these concerns.”42 These statements can be fairly 
read as addressing actual legal and tax rules, or as calls for actual reforms 
of the existing regulatory architecture. And in fact, many legal scholars 
do interpret the arguments as policy advice.43 
But what if the actual legal rules are inefficient, or if there is 
significant uncertainty about their efficiency? And what if there is no 
plausible argument that the tax rules are anywhere close to optimal 
either?44 Then there is no reason to prefer tax rules or legal rules as 
vehicles for redistribution on efficiency grounds. In fact, as is well 
known, changing legal rules to reflect distributional considerations in 
                                                                                                                         
doubt. A few sentences after the quoted sentence he asks: “Why might we want 
to redistribute income?” Id. at 440. Yet his quote in the text above leaves little 
doubt that he believes in redistribution.  
40 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 13, at 669. 
41 Id. at 667 (emphasis added). 
42 Weisbach, supra note 13, at 439 (emphasis added). 
43 See, e.g., Fennell & McAdams, supra note 17, at 1054 (“Our sense today 
is that both the K&S result and the policy advice have become the conventional 
wisdom, at least among many law professors who employ economic analysis.”). 
44 This is, quite likely, the case. See Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits 
of Tax Law and Economics, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 523 (2013). Kaplow has 
shown that the logic of the efficiency-only argument holds even if income tax is 
not optimal. See Louis Kaplow, On the Undesirability of Commodity Taxation 
Even When Income Taxation Is Not Optimal, 90 J. Pub. Econ. 1235 (2006). 
However, the income tax in Kaplow’s proof is a labor income tax that has little 
resemblance to the actual U.S. tax system. 
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these circumstances may increase—not reduce—their efficiency by 
introducing a distortion that offsets some other, pre-existing distortion.45 
So if the efficiency-only argument is taken as a statement that has real-
world significance, the assumption about efficiency of existing legal 
rules becomes critical. And again, reversing this assumption reverses the 
argument’s takeaway. 
The efficiency-only argument’s proponents were always clear that the 
argument is subject to qualifications,46 one of which is particularly 
relevant for our purposes. As Kaplow and Shavell explain, tax rules may 
not clearly dominate legal rules as a redistributive mechanism if there is 
unobservable heterogeneity within income groups.47 If such 
heterogeneity exists, the analysis becomes complicated.  Efficiency-
enhancing distributional adjustment may turn out to favor the rich or the 
poor depending on considerations reflecting unknown empirical facts.48 
If, however, unobservable heterogeneity is such that changing legal rules 
is likely to have desirable distributional effects, Kaplow and Shavell’s 
logic supports these adjustments. 
To summarize, the efficiency-only argument states that legal rules 
should not be used for redistribution, which should be achieved through 
the tax-and-transfer system. To the extent that this argument is viewed as 
policy-relevant, it relies on three assumptions, the first two being 
particularly important. First, the tax-and-transfer system actually is 
                                                      
45 See Richard G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second 
Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956) (“[I]n a situation in which there exists 
many constrains which prevent the fulfillment of the Parteian [sic] optimum 
conditions, the removal of any one constraint may affect welfare or efficiency 
either by raising it, by lowering it, or by leaving it unchanged.”). Half a century 
later, Richard Lipsey stuck to his guns. See Richard G. Lipsey, Reflections on 
the General Theory of Second Best at Its Golden Jubilee, 14 INT’L TAX & PUB. 
FIN. 349, 358 (2007) (“Are there general policy rules for piecemeal 
improvements? My answer … is ‘no.’”). 
46 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 13, at 669, 680-81 (discussing the 
possibility that certain legal disputes are complements or substitutes to income-
generating activities); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 33, at 827-28 (pointing out 
that qualifications do not automatically lead to a conclusion that legal rules 
should reflect distributive concerns); Shavell, supra note 13 at 417 (making the 
offsetting tax system adjustment assumption). 
47 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 13, at 674 n.7; Kaplow & Shavell, 
supra note 33, at 827-32. If the heterogeneity is observable, Kaplow and Shavell 
point out that tax rules should be adjusted to take it into account. See id. at 829 
n.18. 
48 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 33, at 827-33. 
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adjusted to reflect distributional objectives. Second, legal rules are (or 
can realistically be made) efficient. And third, there is no unobserved 
within-income-group heterogeneity that may be harnessed to improve 
distributional outcomes by adjusting a legal rule. Reversing each of these 
assumptions would reverse the efficiency-only argument’s policy 
takeaway. Rather than excluding distributional considerations from the 
design of legal rules, the argument’s logic would lead policymakers to 
include these considerations and, in some cases, change legal rules to 
reflect distributional concerns. 
B. The No-Compensation Argument 
The U.S. government enacts new laws and changes the existing ones 
all the time. These changes often create winners and losers. Yet the 
government generally does not expropriate the gains, nor does it 
compensate the losses. 
The Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution permits the 
government to impose an income tax, that is, to take taxpayers’ money 
without giving anything back, at least not directly.49 Moreover, the 
income tax schedule is progressive, burdening high-income taxpayers 
disproportionately. Congress frequently changes tax rules, including the 
progressivity of the tax system. Yet few would argue today that the 
income tax, its changes, and its progressive rate schedule are 
unconstitutional.50 The Constitution also has the Takings Clause, which 
requires compensation for a specific taking of private property.51 
Occasionally, courts find that government regulation amounts to a 
“regulatory taking.”52 But the small number of such cases reinforces the 
general point that the government owes no compensation when its 
changing rules give rise to unintended economic burdens. 
This is as it should be according to the no-compensation argument. 
The argument comes from the literature on so-called legal transitions, 
                                                      
49 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
50 The most developed objection to taxes as unconstitutional uncompensated 
takings of property comes from Richard Epstein. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 295-303 
(1985). 
51 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
52 For a review of caselaw, see, e.g., Eduardo Moises Penalver, Regulatory 
Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182, 2193-95 (2004) (discussing regulatory 
takings doctrine).  
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and from long-standing critiques of actual transitional assistance. The 
theoretical prong of the argument has been developed by Kaplow in its 
general form,53 and its logic is straightforward. 
Government changes legal rules all the time, the argument goes. 
These changes come in many forms—from property takings to 
regulation, deregulation, judicial decisions, and so on. Many of these 
changes produce “incidental”54 winners and losers.55 The possibility of 
incurring a loss from government action imposes risk on individuals, and 
risk-averse individuals would prefer to mitigate it.56 But if the 
government compensates transitional losers, it would eliminate private 
parties’ incentives to take into account, probabilistically, all “real costs 
and benefits of their decisions.”57 “The belief that market solutions to 
problems of risk and incentives are generally more efficient than 
government remedies implies that the market response to legal 
transitions is similarly more efficient than government transitional 
relief.”58 The market solutions that Kaplow has in mind are private 
insurance and financial diversification.59 
Note that Kaplow’s argument emphasizes—rather than dismisses—
the importance of risk spreading and insurance. His point is simply that 
                                                      
53 Michael Graetz was first to offer reasons why the government should not 
compensate transitional losers, but Graetz’s analysis was limited to tax law and 
admitted exceptions. See Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of 
Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977). Kaplow, in 
contrast, argued that in general, the government should ignore transitional losses 
resulting from government actions. See Kaplow, supra note 14, at 509. 
54 Kaplow, supra note 14, at 519. By “incidental” Kaplow meant unintended. 
Unfortunately, another common meaning of this term is “minor.” Merriam-
Webster online dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/incidental (defining “incidental” as “being likely to 
ensue as a chance or minor consequence” and “occurring merely by chance or 
without intention or calculation”). 
55 For a fuller list of examples of changing rules, see Kaplow, supra note 14, 
at 517. 
56 See id. at 527. 
57 Id. at 529. 
58 Id. at 522. While Kaplow avoids saying that “the belief” he is describing is 
his own, he does point out that governmental “adoption of mechanisms to deal 
with all conceivable market risks would be tantamount to government 
displacement of the market economy.” Id. at 535. 
59 “If this analogy between market and government risks is accepted, 
transition policy should vanish as a separate concern.” Id. at 535. 
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in the context of transitional gains and losses, the best means of 
addressing risk are private rather than social. 
The no-compensation argument also has a more practical prong. Even 
if the government did try to compensate transitional losers, the argument 
goes, the effort would fail. Imagine that the government decided to 
alleviate economic losses incurred by U.S. businesses and workers 
negatively affected by trade liberalization. Difficult questions would 
immediately arise. 
Say a U.S. auto assembly plant moves from Ohio to Mexico after 
U.S. and Mexico sign a free-trade agreement. Surely the plant’s laid off 
workers suffer a loss and they seem to be deserving of government 
compensation. But what about the workers at the plant’s suppliers that go 
bankrupt in the wake of the plant’s relocation—should they be 
compensated as well? And what about those working at a diner near the 
plant that loses most of its customers, a car repair shop in town that 
suffers a precipitous drop in business, or a childcare center that closes 
because laid off autoworkers stay home with their kids?60 It is also not 
clear why workers laid off because their jobs moved to Mexico are more 
deserving of assistance than workers who lost their jobs to automation, 
recession, or just poor management. Even for the workers who clearly 
suffered from trade liberalization, measuring their loss would be no easy 
task. Should we assume, for instance, that these workers will never get 
another job? Should we account for cheaper Mexican-made goods that 
these workers will buy … with whatever money they have left? 
Clair Wilcox raised these concerns about trade adjustment assistance 
in the pages of American Economic Review in 1950.61 Scholars,62 policy 
experts,63 and politicians64 repeated these arguments ever since. The 
                                                      
60 To verify the realism of these hypotheticals, see, e.g., AMY GOLDSTEIN, 
JANESVILLE: AN AMERICAN STORY (2017). 
61 See Wilcox, supra note 15, at 884-89. 
62 See, e.g., Katherine Baicker & M. Marit Rehavi, Trade Adjustment 
Assistance, 18 J. ECON. PERPS. 239, 251-52 (2004) (raising questions about who 
should get transition relief under TAA); Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy 
Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U.L. REV. 391, 
441-42 (2010) (raising same questions about the reach of any transition 
assistance program). 
63 See Hornbeck, supra note 24; ALDEN, supra note 7, at 117 (describing the 
1954 report of President Eisenhower’s Randall Commission). 
64 Id. at 121 (citing President Reagan). 
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persistence of these objections may explain the political vulnerability of 
the TAA and its resulting ineffectiveness.65 
The assumptions underlying the no-compensation argument are easy 
to see. The argument holds only if transitional losses are foreseeable, and 
if private insurance and market diversification are, indeed, available. 
Transitional assistance programs require arbitrary distinctions only if 
they are narrowly targeted. If these assumptions fail to hold, the 
conclusions change to the opposite of those being advanced. Large, 
unforeseeable, uninsurable, and undiversifiable losses to people’s 
livelihoods are the classic reason for social insurance.66 This is as true 
when the losses are caused by changes in government policies as it is 
when they are not. And if a transitional assistance program need not rely 
on questionable distinctions, the arbitrariness objection loses its force. 
 
* * * * * 
One may view the two distributional arguments as pure thought 
experiments with little relevance to the world in which we live. Or one 
may think of them as strictly formal statements with a structure of “if and 
only if X, then Y.” But the argument’s proponents appear to have greater 
ambitions, as revealed by numerous instances when the arguments read 
like direct prescriptions for policymakers.67 Perhaps more importantly, 
both arguments have come to be viewed as guides for actual policy 
reforms.68 It is this connection to real-world policymaking that puts so 
                                                      
65 See ALDEN, supra note 7, at 116-122. The same arguments had the same 
effect in the context of a proposed transitional assistance program for coal 
miners affected by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. See Revesz, supra 
note 17, at 1546-50. 
66 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 22, at 26-27. 
67 See, e.g., supra, text accompanying notes 41, 42, 59. 
68 See, e.g., Ronen Avraham et al., Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and 
Tax Rules in Income Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IOWA 
L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2004) (explaining economists’ belief “that has become the 
new conventional wisdom: that income (or wealth) redistribution is always 
better accomplished through the tax-and-transfer system than through the legal 
system.”); Ilan Benshalom, Rethinking International Distributive Justice: 
Fairness as Insurance, 31 B.U. INT’L L.J. 267, 308 (2013) (“There is a strong 
case for the division-of-labor approach [implementing the efficiency-only 
argument] in a domestic setting” but not internationally); John Brooks et al., 
Cross-Subsidies: Government’s Hidden Pocketbook, 106 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1271 
(2018) (considering the efficiency-only argument in connection with the design 
of the Affordable Care Act); Dagan, supra note 32 (discussing the efficiency-
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much weight on the assumptions underlying these arguments. As this 
Part explains, these assumptions are far from self-evident. It is time to 
examine how plausible they are. 
III. THE UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
The two distributional arguments entered academic debates more than 
three decades ago.69 To evaluate their continuing significance we need to 
understand what has happened in the U.S. economy since then. 
This Part presents the latest evidence that bears on this question. The 
evidence shows that major government policies have produced 
unintended distributional burdens. It is increasingly likely that these 
burdens were large, unanticipated, concentrated, persistent, and fell on 
the same group of Americans who are not well-position to absorb of 
deflect these burdens. 
A. Trade 
One can go back many decades, if not centuries, in search of the 
origins of the economic analysis of trade.70 But the crucial period for our 
purposes is the nineteen eighties and nineties. Free trade was all the rage 
at the time. Developing countries were unilaterally lowering their 
historically high trade barriers.71 They also started to enter into regional 
trade agreements with developed countries, including, of course, the 
United States.72 The U.S. entered into NAFTA in 1994, continued to 
                                                                                                                         
only argument in connection with evaluating the architecture of the international 
tax and legal rules); Fennell & McAdams, supra note 17, at 1054 (explaining 
how a court or any other institutional actor would resolve a dispute following 
the efficiency-only argument); Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational 
Expectations, and Legal Process, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211, 213 
(2003) (advising policymakers to follow the logic of the no-compensation 
argument for corporations but not individuals). 
69 See Graetz, supra note 53, Hylland & Zeckhauser, supra note 13, Kaplow, 
supra note 14, Shavell, supra note 13. 
70 See generally DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE: A 
HISTORY OF U.S. TRADE POLICY (2017). 
71 See Dani Rodrik, The Rush to Free Trade in the Developing World: Why 
So Late? Why Now? Will It Last? 1-3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 3947, 1992), https://www.nber.org/papers/w3947.  
72 See Lorenzo Caliendo & Fernando Parro, Estimates of the Trade and 
Welfare Effects of NAFTA, 82 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 4 n.7 (2015). 
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renew China’s most-favorite-nation trade status throughout the nineties, 
and negotiated the terms of China’s accession to the WTO which took 
place in 2001.73 
At about the same time, trade economists became concerned that 
trade liberalization—something they supported almost uniformly—may 
be contributing to wage inequality that started to reveal itself in the 
data.74 In fact, the foundational trade theory of comparative advantage, 
which Paul Samuelson once called the only proposition in economics 
that is at once true and non-trivial,75 predicts that trade liberalization will 
increase inequality in the developed world. However, after a vigorous 
inquiry, trade economists concluded that technology rather than trade 
was to blame, and turned their attention to studying the effects of trade 
liberalization in the developing world.76 
Not every economist was equally convinced. Dani Rodrik warned 
about the distributive effects of free trade in an influential 1997 book.77 
He pointed out that “the basic models of trade theory [show] that the net 
gains [from trade] and the magnitudes of redistribution are directly 
linked …. The larger the net gains, the larger the redistribution.”78 Others 
expressed concerns as well.79 But those concerns were based on theory 
                                                      
73 See Gregory Shaffer & Henry Gao, China’s Rise: How It Took on the U.S. 
at the WTO, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 115, 131-32 (2018). 
74 See David H. Autor et al., The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market 
Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade, 8 AN. REV. ECON. 205, 206 (2016) 
[hereinafter Autor et al., China Shock]. 
75 See Rodrik, supra note 71, at 1. 
76 See Autor et al., China Shock, supra note 74, at 206 (“After vigorous 
inquiry, concern about the labor-market consequences of trade receded.  
Economists did not find trade to have had substantial adverse distributional 
effects in developed economies, either for low-skill workers specifically or for 
import-competing factors and sectors more generally.”); Pinelopi Goldberg, 
Introduction, in TRADE AND INEQUALITY 2 (2015) (“Until recently, the 
consensus among economists had been that trade had a relatively small effect on 
inequality.  This consensus emerged in the late 1990s after nearly a decade of 
studies by both labor and trade economists …. As a result of [the discovered] 
evidence, interest in the relationship between trade and inequality in developed 
countries subsided.”). 
77 See DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE TOO FAR? (1997). 
78 Dani Rodrik, Interview, 3 WORLD ECON. ASS’N NEWSL. 9, 11 (2013), 
available at 
https://www.worldeconomicsassociation.org/files/newsletters/Issue3-2.pdf.  
79 See Justino De La Cruz et al., Econometric Estimates of the Effects of 
NAFTA: A Review of the Literature (U.S. Int’l Trade Commission, Office of 
Econ. Working Paper No. 2013-12A, 2013). 
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and simulations, not on rigorous empirical evidence.80 So distributional 
objections to free trade remained on the periphery of the economics 
profession. And the objectors—even the most prominent ones—
encountered considerable opprobrium.81 
It took one or two decades for trade economists to return their focus 
to the U.S. and other developed countries. Yet even today—and despite 
recent assertions that “now there is a large body of evidence … about the 
economic effects of NAFTA on the three countries”82—there is just one 
published empirical study of the distributional impact of NAFTA in the 
U.S.83 Its main finding is that blue-collar workers in industries and 
locations most exposed to NAFTA (that is, where tariffs went from high 
to low) bore a very high cost. Their wage growth over a decade was 17 
percentage points (not percent!) lower compared to industries where 
tariffs were already low and NAFTA changed little.84 Even low-wage 
workers outside of the affected industries but living in locations where 
those industries were prevalent experienced substantially lower wage 
growth. College-educated workers, in contrast, saw no statistically 
significant wage changes. 
The China shock has received more attention, at least in part because 
its empirical analysis is less vulnerable to endogeneity concerns.85 Over 
the past several years, a group of leading economists has published 
several influential papers arguing that China’s accession to the WTO 
accounts for one quarter of the aggregate decline in U.S. manufacturing 
                                                      
80 See id. 
81 See Paul A. Samuelson, Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm 
Arguments of Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization, 18 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 135, 135-37, 143-45 (2004) (raising some doubts about the benefits of 
globalization, and concluding that “mainstream trade economists have 
insufficiently noticed the drastic change in mean U.S. incomes and in 
inequalities among different U.S. classes.”); Avinash Dixit & Gene Grossman, 
Comment, The Limits of Free Trade, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 241-42 (2005); Paul A. 
Samuelson, Response from Paul A. Samuelson, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 242-43 
(2005). 
82 De La Cruz et al., supra note 79, at 2. 
83 See Shushanik Hakobyan & John McLaren, Looking For Local Labor 
Market Effects of NAFTA, 98 REV. ECON. & STAT. 728, 728-29 (2016) 
(observing that “economists to date have not provided an answer to the question 
of whether NAFTA has indeed had the effects ascribed to it by its opponents,” 
who argued—without evidence at the time—that “NAFTA has destroyed 
millions of U.S. jobs”). 
84 See id. at 729. 
85 See Autor et al., China Shock, supra note 74, at 210. 
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employment86 and a loss of between two and 2.4 million jobs overall 
between 1999 to 2011.87 In addition to outright job losses, China’s entry 
into the WTO reduced wages of those low-skill workers who managed to 
keep their jobs.88 As with NAFTA, these losses were highly concentrated 
by industry and location. And as with NAFTA, the empirical findings are 
recent.89 
The disconcerting view of China’s accession to the WTO is not 
universally accepted. Zhi Wang and colleagues argue in a recent working 
paper that David Autor, Daron Acemoglu, Gordon Hanson and others got 
the China shock backwards.90 Accounting for what the paper calls 
“supply chains,” Wang and colleagues conclude that trade with China 
has led to “a net job increase of 1.27% (as a share of working age 
cohort)”91 and to higher wages for 75% of the workers in an average 
region (average in terms of exposure to Chinese competition).92 Autor 
and co-authors disagree, arguing that upstream effects are negative while 
downstream effects are “small and insignificant in the aggregate.”93 But 
                                                      
86 See David H. Autor et al., The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market 
Effects of Import Competition in the United States, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2121, 
2121 (2013) [hereinafter Autor et al., China Syndrome]; Autor et al., China 
Shock, supra note 74, at 213-214 (offering reasons why China’s accession to the 
WTO—rather than China’s economic development in general—is the likely 
reason for U.S. job losses); Justin R. Pierce and Peter K. Schott. The 
Surprisingly Swift Decline of US Manufacturing Employment, 106 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1632, 1632 (2016) (linking an 18% “plunge” in U.S. manufacturing 
employment between 2001 and 2007 to the U.S. grant to China of the permanent 
normal trade relations that became effective on China’s accession to the WTO). 
87 See Daron Acemoglu et al., Import Competition and the Great US 
Employment Sag of the 2000s, 34 J. LAB. ECON. S141, S141 (2016). 
88 See Autor et al., China Shock, supra note 74, at 229. 
89 See Goldberg, supra note 76, at 7 (noting that Autor et al., China 
Syndrome, supra note 86, was the first paper to report large effects of the China 
Shock). 
90 See Zhi Wang et al., Re-Examining the Effects of Trading with China on 
Local Labor Markets: A Supply Chain Perspective 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 24886, 2018), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24886 (“incorporating a supply chain perspective 
… can overturn the received wisdom in the literature” expressed in Autor et al., 
China Syndrome, supra note 86). 
91 Id. at 2. 
92 See id. 
93 Autor et al., China Shock, supra note 74, at 228 n.33, 234. In contrast, 
Wang and co-authors conclude that “the job gains from the downstream channel 
are not only statistically significant but also economically powerful enough to 
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importantly, Wang and colleagues agree with Autor and co-authors that 
the majority of workers with less-than-college education have suffered 
wage losses, and that these losses have been particularly large (15-25% 
declines) for the lowest deciles of wage distribution.94 While this bottom-
line conclusion is not unanimous,95 most high-quality econometric 
research of the past several years reveals large and geographically 
concentrated negative effects of trade liberalization on American blue-
collar workers.96 
B. Immigration 
In terms of their political significance, distributional effects of U.S. 
trade policies rival only those of immigration. Economists have been 
studying how immigrants affect wages and jobs of American workers for 
a long time.97 There is a vigorous debate among leading labor economists 
about the effect of low-skill immigration on wages of low-skill 
Americans. “[T]he existing literature demonstrates that it is quite 
difficult to isolate the impact of immigration on wages. Even more 
problematic, it turns out that the evidence often depends on researcher 
choices about how to frame the empirical analysis.”98 
                                                                                                                         
more than offset the combined negative effects from direct competition and the 
upstream channel.” Wang et al., supra note 90, at 2. 
94 See id. at 25-26. 
95 Yet another recent paper argues that “the finding that the China shock is 
pro-rich is fragile, as it depends on how non-labor income is apportioned across 
groups.” Simon Galle et al., Quantifying the Aggregate and Distributional 
Effects of Trade 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23737, 
2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23737. 
96 Another recent paper shows that the same areas that mostly suffered from 
trade liberalization also benefited from it. As a result, perhaps surprisingly, 
repealing NAFTA would hurt workers in the same locations that suffered when 
NAFTA was enacted. Raphael A. Auer et al., The Economics and Politics of 
Revoking NAFTA, 68 IMF ECON. REV. 230, 232-33 (2020). The key finding for 
our purposes is that some workers did suffer from NAFTA, even though other 
workers living nearby gained from it. On the other hand, the paper’s result is 
difficult to reconcile with Hakobyan and McLaren who found that low-skill 
workers in the entire areas impacted by NAFTA were negatively affected. See 
Hakobyan & McLaren, supra note 83. 
97 See Shelby D. Gerking & John H. Mutti, Costs and Benefits of Illegal 
Immigration: Key Issues for Government Policy, 61 SOC. SCI. Q. 71, 72 (1980); 
Jean B. Grossman, The Substitutability of Natives and Immigrants in 
Production, 64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 596, 600-602 (1982).  
98 Jason Anastasopoulos et al., Job Vacancies and Immigration: Evidence 
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George Borjas and co-authors have produced a large body of work 
demonstrating that low-skill immigration depresses wages and 
employment of low-skill American workers.99 This conclusion seemingly 
follows from the basic analysis of supply and demand.100 Yet David Card 
and others have been arguing that the effects, if any, are small,101 
emphasizing that Borjas’ “‘revisionist’ view of recent U.S. immigration 
is overly pessimistic.”102 
As with trade, the warning signs came decades ago. An early red flag 
appeared in a 1996 study by Borjas, Richard Freeman, and Lawrence 
Katz (all leading economists).103 They found “negative relations between 
immigration-induced changes in supply and native wages. [Moreover,] 
immigration contributed more to the decline in the relative earnings of 
high-school dropouts than trade, while both modestly reduced the 
earnings of high-school workers relative to college workers.”104 
Twenty years of subsequent research have not brought a consensus 
among labor economists. Summarizing the literature, Eric Posner and 
Glen Weyl highlight the continuing disagreements: 
                                                                                                                         
From Pre- and Post-Mariel Miami 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper 24580, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24580 (emphasis in 
original). 
99 See id. at 5-6; George Borjas, The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward 
Sloping: Reexamining the Impacts of Immigration on the Labor Market, 118 
Q.J. ECON. 1355 (2003). 
100 As Paul Samuelson notes, “[i]f mass immigration into the United States 
of similar workers to [low-skill, low-education American workers] had been 
permitted to actually take place, mainstream economists could not avoid 
predicting a substantial drop in wages of this native group ….” Samuelson, 
supra note 81, at 144. 
101 See David Card & John E. DiNardo, Do Immigrants Inflows Lead to 
Native Outflows, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 360 (2000); David Card, Immigrant 
Inflows, Native Outflows and the Local labor Market Impacts of Higher 
Immigration, 19 J. LABOR ECON. 22 (2001); Giovanni Peri & Vasil Yasenov, 
The Labor Market Effects of a Refugee Wave: Applying the Synthetic Control 
Method to the Mariel Boatlift (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 21801, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w21801; Ethan G. Lewis, Local 
Open Economics Within the US: How Do Industries Respond to Immigration? 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 04-1, 2003).  
102 David Card, Is The New Immigration Really So Bad?, 115 ECON. J. F300, 
F300 (2005). 
103 See George Borjas et al., Searching for the Effect of Immigration on the 
Labor Market, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 246 (1996). 
104 Id. Needless to say, the trade data studied by Borjas and co-authors did 
not include the effects of NAFTA or the China shock. 
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There is significant evidence that immigration reduces 
the wages of native workers whose backgrounds are 
similar to those of migrants. For example, illegal 
immigration to the United States from Mexico and Central 
America tends to hurt native workers with low education 
and weak language skills. However, the effects of 
migration on the broader labor markets are murkier. Some 
scholars believe that the native workers are in aggregate 
harmed, albeit only to a limited extent. Others argue that 
effects are negligible or even that most workers may 
benefit ….105 
The disagreement between the two camps is so fundamental, that 
Card, Borjas, and others continue to debate the consequences of a single 
event—the Mariel boatlift—that took place almost forty years ago. Card 
finds that the boatlift had virtually no impact on local wages.106 Borjas 
finds that wages of “native” high-school dropouts fell by ten to thirty 
percent.107  
In the view of the National Academy of Sciences, the weight of 
evidence is shifting toward a greater concern about the effects of low-
skill immigration. Revisiting its comprehensive 1997 analysis of 
economic and fiscal consequences of immigration, the Academy reached 
the following conclusion in 2017: 
At that time [that is, in 1997], the authoring panel’s 
conclusion that ‘immigration has had a relatively small 
adverse impact on the wage and employment opportunities 
of competing native groups’ seemed to summarize well 
what the academic studies indicated. However, the 
intensive research on this topic over the past two decades 
… displays a much wider variation in the estimates of the 
                                                      
105 ERIC A. POSNER & GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING 
CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 143 (2018) (citing sources). 
For a similar assessment see ROBERT SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: 
RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY 159 (noting that entry of “hard-working and well-
meaning people from developing countries … would in many cases harm the 
interests of the indigenous population, who do have rights of citizenship that 
must be honored”). 
106 See David Card, The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor 
Market, 43 INDUS. & LABOR REV. 245 (1990). 
107 See George J. Borjas, The Wage Impact of the Marielitos: A Reappraisal, 
70 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 1077, 1077 (2017). 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3692798
2020]             DISTRIBUTIONAL ARGUMENTS, IN REVERSE 29 
 
wage impact on natives who are most likely to compete 
with immigrants, with some studies suggesting sizable 
negative wage effects on native high school dropouts …. 
Thus, evidence suggests that groups comparable to 
immigrants in terms of their skill may experience a wage 
reduction as a result of immigration-induced increases in 
labor supply, although there are still a number of studies 
that suggest small to zero effects.108 
The latest research using the highest quality data explains why the earlier 
studies that found small effects may be misleading. These studies were 
capable of detecting only average effects, and averages masked the 
existence of both significant winners and significant losers.109 A more 
granular look shows that low-skill Americans “who appear to be 
displaced by immigrant labor and move out of their local labor market” 
are the losers.110 So while the economic losses of low-skill Americans 
exposed to an influx of low-skill immigrants are still debated, they are 
likely and likely to be significant. 
C. Market Concentration 
Economists studying the growth of economic inequality have been 
focused on trade and immigration for some time. More recently, another 
trio of explanations has entered the distributional debates: the rise of 
concentration in product, labor, and capital markets. 
The numbers are striking. Jan De Loecker, Jan Eeckhout, and Gabriel 
Unger show that since 1980, product markups (profits that firms capture 
by setting prices of the goods they sell in excess of costs)111 increased 
                                                      
108 NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING AND MEDICINE, THE 
ECONOMIC AND FISCAL CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 247-48 (Francine D. 
Blau & Christopher Mackie eds., 2017). 
109 Joseph Price et al., The Winners and Losers of Immigration: Evidence 
from Linked Historical Data 1-3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 27156, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27156 (investigating 
novel panel comprising individual-level data on location, occupation, 
employment, and income of workers affected by impact of new immigrants 
during 1910’s and 1920’s). 
110 Id. at 1. 
111 A markup is what a firm charges above its marginal cost. See Jan De 
Loecker et al., The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications 
135 Q.J. ECON. 561, 562 (2020). In a perfectly competitive economy the markup 
is zero. See Suresh Naidu et al., Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, 
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from 21% to 61%.112 The increase suggests a dramatic rise in market 
power that could explain the decrease in labor and capital shares in 
national income, the decline of low-skill wages, and the drop in labor 
force participation, the authors conclude.113 Robert Hall examined 
markups in specific industries (rather than in the entire economy), and 
confirmed their rise, revealing a “substantial growth in market power,” 
though not as dramatic as De Loecker and co-authors suggest.114 
Another recent blockbuster paper by Simcha Barkai argues that 
economists have completely missed the rise of abnormal returns to 
capital (economic windfalls or rents115) by simply assuming them away 
based on empirical findings from the 1980s.116 In the meantime, rents 
grew to $14,000 per employee in 2014—almost half of median personal 
                                                                                                                         
132 HARV. L. REV. 536, 556 (2018) (“The markup equals the difference between 
the monopoly price and the competitive price, and thus serves as a natural gauge 
of market power ….”). 
112 See De Loecker et al., supra note 111, at 561. 
113 See id. at 563, 566. Labor share of national income is “the fraction of 
economic output that accrues to workers as compensation in exchange for their 
labor,” Estimating the U.S. Labor Share, MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Feb. 2017), or 
“a share of labor income in total sales or value added,” David Autor et al., 
Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share, 107 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & 
PROC. 180, 185 (2017), or just labor’s share of Gross Domestic Product, see id. 
at 180. When market power increases, whether due to monopoly or monopsony 
power, rents (the share of total output the firms obtain because of their market 
power) rise, while capital share (the share of output that firms obtain due to their 
productive activities) and labor share fall. See Naidu et al., supra note 111, at 
565. 
114 Robert E. Hall, New Evidence on the Markup of Prices over Marginal 
Costs and the Role of Mega-Firms in the US Economy 14 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24574, 2018), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24574. 
115 “Economic rents are the return to a factor of production in excess of what 
is required to keep it in the market…. By definition, they are excessive returns to 
market activity that would have occurred anyway in their absence.” Jason 
Furman & Peter Orszag, A Firm-Level Perspective on the Role of Rents in the 
Rise in Inequality, in TOWARD A JUST SOCIETY: JOSEPH STIGLITZ AND TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY ECONOMICS 20 (Martin Guzman ed., 2018). 
116 See Simcha Barkai, Declining Labor and Capital Shares , 75 J. FIN. 2421 
2458 (2020) (“Past empirical estimates of small economic pure profits together 
with the potential theoretical advantage of indirectly inferring capital costs have 
led many researchers to prefer the assumption of zero pure profits over the direct 
measurement of capital costs.”). The assumption of zero rents was consistent 
with a broader view among economists, especially applied economists, that 
markets are perfectly competitive and no firms have monopoly power. See 
POSNER & WEYL, supra note 105, at 23-29. 
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income in the U.S.117 Barkai argues that decline in competition explains 
the rise of windfall profits.118 
These findings are consistent with yet another recent study by 
Gustavo Grullon and colleagues who find that 75% of U.S. industries 
have experienced an increase in concentration levels over the last two 
decades.119 “To the extent industries look more like oligopolies than 
perfectly competitive markets, they will generate economic rents … 
[eroding] the surplus that would otherwise accrue to consumers in a 
competitive market.”120 Grullon and co-authors suggest that lax 
enforcement of antitrust laws may explain the increase. Economists in 
the Obama White House had similar concerns.121 Recent econometric 
research “has found tacit collusion to be unexpectedly prevalent.”122 
Given the “revolution” that re-oriented antitrust law towards efficiency 
and away from other social objectives over the past decades,  the drop of 
some merger reviews by the FTC and DOJ, and a sharp decline in 
antitrust challenges, these concerns seem well-founded.123 
One should not confuse concerns with consensus. Some of the papers 
just discussed are unpublished, and other scholars have already raised 
objections.124 For example, an increase in industry concentration may 
                                                      
117 See POSNER & WEYL, supra note 105, at 39. 
118 See Barkai, supra note 116, at 2422. 
119 See Gustavo Grullon et al., Are U.S. Industries Becoming More 
Concentrated?, 23 REV. OF FIN. 697, 697 (2019). 
120 Furman & Orszag, supra note 115, at 35. 
121 See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS ISSUE BRIEF, BENEFITS OF 
COMPETITION AND INDICATORS OF MARKET POWER 1 (May 2016). 
122 Steven Berry et al., Do Increasing Markups Matter? Lessons from 
Empirical Industrial Organization, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 44, 60 (2019). 
123 See John Kwoka, Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A Response 
to the FTC Critique (Working Paper, March 2017); 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2947814 (describing the decline in antitrust 
enforcement); Thomas G. Wollman, Stealth Consolidation: Evidence from an 
Amendment to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 1 AER: INSIGHTS 77, 78-79 (2019) 
(concluding that the 2000 amendment to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvements Act that increased the threshold for premerger review led to a 
large increase in mergers between competitors). Inadequate enforcement may 
have reflected a misunderstanding of the changing markets. See POSNER & 
WEYL, supra note 105, at 177 (“Beginning in the 1970s and accelerating from 
the 1980s onward, antitrust authorities lost track of the ways in which capital 
markets reconfigured themselves to maintain monopoly power.”). 
124 See Susanto Basu, Are Price-Cost Markups Rising in the United States? A 
Discussion of the Evidence, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2019); Berry et al., supra note 
122; Loukas Karabarbounis & Brent Neiman, Accounting for Factorless 
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reflect an increase in market power or it may not.125 A dramatic increase 
in markups suggests an even greater decline of the labor share than the 
actual one.126 No doubt, the debates about the monopoly power in the 
U.S. economy will continue.127 But clearly, there are strong reasons to be 
concerned. 
Turning from product to labor markets, the emerging evidence reveals 
a significant increase in the employers’ power over workers. Examining 
a near-universe of online job vacancies, José Azar and co-authors find 
that judging by the DOJ/FTC standards (that those agencies use in 
product markets), 54% of U.S. labor markets are highly concentrated and 
another 11% are moderately concentrated.128 These macro-effects are 
consistent with the evidence of anticompetitive labor market practices at 
the micro-level, ranging from non-poaching agreements129 to non-
compete clauses,130 to expansive licensing requirements.131 Weak 
antitrust enforcement against labor market monopsony and legal 
obstacles to employees’ challenges of employer market power have not 
helped.132 “A key worry … is that anticompetitive practices have often 
                                                                                                                         
Income, 33 NBER MACROECON. ANNUAL 167 (2018); James Traina, Is 
Aggregate Market Power Increasing? Production Trends Using Financial 
Statements, Working Paper, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3120849. 
125 See Chad Syverson, Macroeconomics and Market Power: Facts, 
Potential Explanations and Open Questions, BROOKINGS ECON. STUD. 4 (Jan. 
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/macroeconomics-and-market-
power-facts-potential-explanations-and-open-questions/.  
126 See Basu, supra note 124, at 19. 
127 In fact, De Loecker and co-authors have already replied to the criticisms 
of their work, pointing out that some of their critics rely on an unrealistic 
assumption and an ill-fitting modeling framework. See De Loecker et al., supra 
note 111, at 603-05. 
128 See José Azar et al., Concentration in U.S. Labor Markets: Evidence 
From Online Vacancy Data 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 24395, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24395. These numbers tend to 
overstate the economic significance of market concentration somewhat because 
many highly concentrated markets are very small. See David Berger et al., 
Labor Market Power 9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
25719, 2019), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25719. Still, the numbers are 
striking. 
129 See Naidu et al., supra note 111, at 571-72. 
130 See Alan B. Krueger & Eric A. Posner, A Proposal for Protecting Low-
Income Workers from Monopsony and Collusion, THE HAMILTON PROJECT 7-8 
(Feb. 2018). 
131 See infra, text accompanying notes 240-243. 
132 See Naidu et al., supra note 111, at 569-73. 
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targeted the most vulnerable workers: those with limited education and 
low skills.”133 
Greater employer concentration corresponds to lower wages—a 
relationship that is more pronounced at high levels of concentration and 
that has increased over time.134 Moreover, in areas where labor market 
concentration has increased, low earners have seen their wages decline 
while high earners have experienced little change in their wages.135 
These trends are even more troubling than they appear because greater 
concentration also leads to employers demanding higher skills, especially 
from their low-skill workers.136 So these workers’ skill-based wages 
should be higher, not lower when concentration increases. 
Suresh Naidu, Eric Posner and Glen Weyl roughly estimate that 
“monopsony power in the U.S. economy reduces overall output and 
employment by 13%, and labor’s share of national output by 22%.”137 
New, micro-level empirical work shows that “the degree of monopsony 
power is substantially larger in low-wage labor markets.”138  David 
Berger and colleagues disagree that labor market power has led to the 
decline in the labor share, but show convincingly that this oligopsony 
power has imposed “substantial welfare losses … ranging from 2.9 to 8.0 
percent of lifetime consumption.”139 
                                                      
133 Id. at 572. 
134 See José Azar et al., Labor Markets Concentration 1-2 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24147, 2017), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24147; Efraim Benmelech et al., Strong 
Employers and Weak Employees: How Does Employer Concentration Affect 
Wages? 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24307, 2018), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24307. 
135 See Kevin Rinz, Labor Market Concentration, Earnings Inequality, and 
Earning Mobility, Ctr. for Admin. Records Research and Applications Working 
Paper 2018-10 4-5, https://www.census.gov/library/working-
papers/2018/adrm/carra-wp-2018-10.html. 
136 See Brad Hershbein & Claudia Macaluso, Labor Market Concentration 
and the Demand for Skills 5 (Working Paper, July 30, 2018), 
http://conference.iza.org/conference_files/DATA_2018/macaluso_c26795.pdf. 
137 Naidu et al., supra note 111, at 538. 
138 Ihsaan Bassier et al., Monopsony in Movers: The Elasticity of Labor 
Supply to Firm Wage Policies 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 27755, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27755. 
139 Berger et al., supra note 128, at 1. The welfare loss arises due to lower 
wages, less time spent working, and more work taking place at lower 
productivity firms. Id. at 37. 
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As always, there are doubts. The decline of labor share in the national 
income may be due to trade liberalization.140 Labor markets more 
exposed to the China shock are also more concentrated,141 at least in part 
because some domestic firms went out of business. It is also possible that 
technological change gives rise to “superstar firms” with higher 
productivity, and these firms capture an increasingly greater market 
share.142 Some evidence supports this hypothesis, at least for the U.S. 
manufacturing.143 So maybe it is trade and technology after all, perhaps 
along with the U.S. competition policy and its (lax) enforcement, that 
explain the increase in market concentration. 
Finally, recent research suggests that the current historically high 
degree of common ownership of most publicly traded firms may be 
harmful to economic competition. BlackRock, State Street, Vanguard, 
and Fidelity together control more than a fifth of the value of the U.S. 
stock market.144 The first of these three constitute the single largest 
shareholder in eighty eight percent of public companies in the S&P500 
index.145 And the consequences may be starting to show.  
Airlines prices, for example, are arguably 3-7% higher due to 
anticompetitive power of institutional investors.146  Researchers observed 
similar effects in the banking industry.147 These results are recent, and 
there are already strong counterarguments.148 Nonetheless, there is a real 
                                                      
140 See Michael W.L. Elsby et al., The Decline of the U.S. Labor Share, 
Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity 1 (Fall 2013), 
https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/the-decline-of-the-u-s-labor-share/ 
(concluding that “offshoring of the labor-intensive component of the U.S. supply 
chain [is] a leading potential explanation of the decline in the U.S. labor share 
over the past 25 years.”). 
141 See Benmelech et al., supra note 134, at 5. 
142 See David Autor et al., The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of 
Superstar Firms, 135 Q.J. ECON. 645, 645 (2020) [hereinafter Autor, Superstar 
Firms]. 
143 See id. at 665-70. 
144 See POSNER & WEYL, supra note 105, at 171. 
145 See Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index 
Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and new Financial Risk, 19 
BUS. & POLITICS 298 (2017). 
146 See José Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. 
FIN. 1513, 1517 (2018). 
147 See José Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition 1, 3 
(Working Paper, July 23, 2016), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252. 
148 See Patrick Dennis et al., Common Ownership Does Note Have Anti-
Competitive Effects in the Airline Industry (Working Paper, Feb. 5, 2018); 
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possibility that concentration in product and labor (and maybe even 
capital) markets has harmed American workers and consumers, 
especially those who live in the areas where employers exert significant 
market power over wages. 
D. Labor Policy 
Since at least the 1970’s, membership in private sector labor unions 
has been declining while wage inequality has been increasing.149 Are the 
two changes related? 
Over time, scholars have offered different answers. One side has 
argued that the relationship between union membership and wage 
inequality is weak at best.150 The other side has asserted that “the decline 
in organized labor explains a fifth to a third of the growth in [wage] 
inequality [between 1973 and 2007]—a major effect comparable to that 
of the growing stratification of wages by education.”151 
The latest research relying on new data supports, and even magnifies, 
the latter view. A recent working paper overcomes a long-standing 
empirical challenge—absence of micro-level data on union membership 
prior to 1973—and finds that “unions have had a significant, equalizing 
effect on the income distribution over” the period of 1936 to the 
                                                                                                                         
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3063465 (finding no relationship between airline ticket 
prices and common ownership of airlines); Erik P. Gilje et al., Who’s Paying 
Attention? Measuring Common Ownership and Its Impact on Managerial 
Incentives, 137 J. FIN. ECON. 152, 154 (2020) (finding that accounting for 
possible investor inattention “cast[s] doubt on the idea that overlapping 
ownership structures, particularly those driven by asset manager mergers, 
significantly shift managers’ incentive or induce anticompetitive behaviors 
among firms in the airline and banking industries” as suggested by Azar and co-
authors); John Morley, Too Big to Be Activist, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1412-13 
(2020) (explaining why exercise of market power is unlikely given the 
institutional structure of the major institutional investors). 
149 See Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in 
U.S. Wage Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 513, (2011). 
150 See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu et al., Deunionization, Technical Change and 
Inequality, in 55 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONF. SERIES ON PUB. POL’Y 229, 230 
(2001) (“Most economists, however, discount the role of unions in the increase 
in inequality.”). 
151 Western & Rosenfeld, supra note 149, at 513, 517 (stating the conclusion 
and comparing it with studies finding both weak and significant relationship). 
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present.152 Moreover, strong unions disproportionately helped less-skilled 
workers, something that weak unions of today no longer do.153 
The emerging evidence of labor market concentration further 
highlights the importance of labor unions. Not only does greater market 
power of employers depress wages, but the negative correlation between 
wages and market power is stronger when unionization rates are low.154  
There is also new evidence that government regulation weakening 
employment protections diminishes the bargaining power of workers and 
reduces their wages.155 “Somewhat surprisingly,” the extensive analysis 
of the well-known decline in labor share “has touched very little on the 
role of labor market regulation.”156 Yet it now appears quite likely that 
decades of U.S. (anti-)labor policies that contributed to the decline of 
labor unions harmed American workers, especially low-skill ones.157 And 
                                                      
152 Henry S. Farber et al., Unions and Inequality Over the Twentieth 
Century: New Evidence from Survey Data 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 24587, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24587. 
153 See id. at 3. 
154 See Benmelech et al., supra note 134, at 4. The “it appears” qualifier in 
the text is there because the link between the decline in labor share and 
unionization is uncertain. Compare Michael W.L. Elsby et al., The Decline of 
the U.S. Labor Share, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1 (Fall 2013), 
https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/the-decline-of-the-u-s-labor-share/ 
(stating that “institutional explanations based on the decline in unionization is 
inconclusive” in explaining the decline in the labor share) with Autor et al., 
Superstar Firms, supra note 142, at 648 (noting that “the broadly common 
experience of a decline in labor shares across countries with different levels and 
evolutions of unionization and other labor market institutions somewhat 
vitiates” the connection between “unions and the real value of the minimum 
wage.”) Yet new evidence suggests that deregulation of job protection laws in 
26 countries did “contribute[ ] to some of the observed decline in labor shares in 
many advanced economics ….” Gabriele Ciminelli et al., Employment 
Protection Deregulation and Labor Shares in Advanced Economies, IMF 
WORKING PAPER WP/18/186 (2018), 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/08/16/Employment-
Protection-Deregulation-and-Labor-Shares-in-Advanced-Economies-46074. 
155 See id. at 7. 
156 Id. at 8. 
157 See Farber et al., supra note 152, at 3 (concluding that market “forces 
alone cannot explain patterns in union membership over the 20th century); 
TIMOTHY NOAH, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: AMERICA’S GROWING INEQUALITY 
CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 138-43 (2012) (describing the 
consequences of the Taft-Hartley Act passed in 1947 and the later appointment 
of an anti-union head of NLRB by President Reagan); Western & Rosenfeld, 
supra note 149, at 516 (same). 
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because today’s public sector unions are the only ones yielding economic 
advantages for their members,158 the recent Supreme Court decision 
weakening these unions,159 as well as public-sector unions’ loss of public 
support and political clout in both parties,160 is bound to be particularly 
costly for a large group of working Americans. 
Drawing on many recent empirical findings discussed in the Part, 
Anna Stansbury and Lawrence Summers make the broadest and the 
boldest claim: the decline of “worker power”—and not globalization, 
technological transformation, or the rise of monopoly or monopsony 
power—is the best explanation for the “fall in the labor income share, an 
increase in [Tobin’s] Q, corporate profitability, and measured markups, 
and a fall in the [non-accelerating rate of unemployment].”161 The 
magnitude of the decline is significant: the share of product market rents 
captured by labor declined by half, “from 12% of net value added in the 
nonfinancial corporate business sector in the early 1980s to 6% in the 
2010s.”162 And—should we be surprised?—“the decline in labor rents 
was larger for non-college-educated workers than for college-educated 
workers.”163 What caused the loss of worker power? Stansbury and 
                                                      
158 See David Card et al., Unions and Wage Inequality: The Roles of Gender, 
Skill and Public Sector Employment 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 25313, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25313 (finding 
that private sector unions reduce male wage inequality by 1.7% and female 
wage inequality by 0.6% while the respective numbers for public sector unions 
are 16.2% and 50%). 
159 See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cry., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 
(2018) (finding that mandatory collection of public union fees is 
unconstitutional). 
160 See Dorian T. Warren, The Politics of Labor Policy Reform, in THE 
POLITICS OF MAJOR POLICY REFORM IN POSTWAR AMERICA 103, 119 (Jeffery A. 
Jenkins & Sidney M. Mikis eds., 2014) (describing the deteriorating public 
standing of public sector unions and anti-union measures of both Republican 
and Democratic governors in the wake of the Great Recession). 
161 Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power 
Hypothesis: An Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American Economy 
1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 27193, 2020), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w27193. By worker power the authors mean power 
“arising from unionization or the threat of union organizing, firms being run 
partly in the interests of workers as stakeholders, and/or from efficiency wage 
effects ….” Id. 
162 Id. at 4. 
163 Id. at 7. 
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Summers offer several reasons, but changes in government labor market 
policies are the first on their list.164 
E. Environmental Policy 
On the environmental front, decades-long extensive work on the 
incidence of environmental taxes, subsidies, and tradable permits has had 
little to say about the distributional effects of non-tax regulation.165  Yet 
regulation—and not taxes and tradeable permits—has been Congress’ 
primary environmental policy tool. 
Emerging research finds that regulatory mandates have significant 
distributional effects. Building energy codes, for example, 
disproportionately harm low-income home owners.166 Corporate average 
fuel economy (CAFE) standards are not only regressive, but are more 
regressive than carbon taxes would be.167 The same may be true of other 
command-and-control regulation.168  
                                                      
164 See id. at 2 (listing “[f]irst, institutional changes: the policy environment 
has become less supportive of worker power by reducing the incidence of unions 
and the credibility of the ‘threat effect’ of unionism or other organized labor” 
and the fall of minimum wage in real terms). 
165 A 2008 comprehensive review of environmental policy instruments 
devoted just one or two sentences to the subject without citing any prior 
research. See Lawrence H. Goulder & Ian W.H. Parry, Instrument Choice in 
Environmental Policy, 2 REV. ENVIRON. ECON. & POL’Y 152, 166 (2008); see 
also Don Fullerton & Erich Muehlegger, Who Bears the Economic Costs of 
Environmental Regulations?, 13 REV. ENVIRON. ECON. & POL’Y 62, 62 (2019) 
(making the same observation a decade later). 
166 See Chris Bruegge et al., The Distributional Effects of Building Energy 
Codes, 6 J. ASSOC. ENVIRON. RESOURCE ECON. S95, S99 (2019). 
167 See Lucas W. Davis & Christopher R. Knittel, Are Fuel Economy 
Standards Regressive?, 6 J. ASSOC. ENVIRON. RESOURCE ECON. S37, S38-39 
(2019) (finding that CAFE standards are regressive when their effects on costs 
of both new and used vehicles are taken into account); Arik Levinson, Energy 
Efficiency Standards Are More Regressive Than Energy Taxes: Theory and 
Evidence, 6 J. ASSOC. ENVIRON. RESOURCE ECON. S7, S9 (2019) (2019) (finding 
that CAFE standards are more regressive than a carbon tax when both the type 
of vehicle and the miles driven are considered). 
168 See Fullerton & Muehlegger, supra note 165, at 7 (reviewing “new and 
emerging empirical literature on distributional effects of non-tax environmental 
mandates and regulations” and finding that “mandates are more regressive than 
a carbon tax when compared in a revenue-neutral way”). 
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Regulatory mandates may also lead to higher unemployment in 
polluting industries in areas where these industries are concentrated.169 
While in basic economic models of environmental regulation “jobs are a 
cost, not a benefit,”170 there is clear evidence that the basic models are 
too basic. They ignore the costs of changing jobs as well as the relative 
job quality.171 Yet these costs are substantial, and no work in 
environmental economics (or elsewhere) “attempts to model the effect of 
regulation on job quality.”172 In fact, “there is a sharp disconnect between 
the political importance of the jobs question and the limited research on 
the job effects of [environmental] policy ….”173 
If environmental regulation replaces “good jobs” in West Virginia 
with “bad jobs” half way across the country, the resulting distributional 
burdens or overall social welfare impacts are not known. The latest 
models suggest that environmental mandates produce greater labor 
market disruptions than environmental taxes or tradable permits do.174 
Economic analysis of all these issues is just beginning. Given wide-
spread use of environmental mandates, the unintended distributional 
effects of U.S. environmental policies are yet another cause for concern. 
E. Efficiency of U.S. Markets 
Until now, the discussion focused on the recent evidence of the 
effects of various U.S. policies on American workers. We now turn from 
policies to markets. It turns out that emerging evidence is changing 
economists’ long-settled views here as well. 
Not long ago economists believed that U.S. labor, product, and capital 
markets are generally efficient. Trade economists, for instance, assumed 
that American labor force is highly mobile, that “U.S. markets are 
smoothly integrated across space,”175 reflecting their efficiency.176 This 
                                                      
169 See Kenneth A. Castellanos & Garth Heutel, Unemployment, Labor 
Mobility, and Climate Policy 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 25797, 2019), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25797. 
170 Marc A.C. Hafstead & Roberton C. Williams III, Jobs and Environmental 
Regulation, 1 ENVIRON. ENERGY POL’Y  & ECON. 192, 198 (2020). 
171 See id. at 204-06. 
172 Id. at 205. The only exceptions that authors cite is a highly stylized model 
of the effect of trade liberalization on a population of identical workers. 
173 Id. at 192. 
174 See id. at 29, 36-42. 
175 Autor et al., China Shock, supra note 74, at 235. 
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assumption was critical to the analysis of the distributional effects of 
trade liberalization. If workers move easily between firms, industries, 
and regions,177 they will leave the industries and places disadvantaged by 
growing foreign imports and move to industries and places that flourish 
due to growing U.S. exports. In fact, this movement (“factor 
reallocation” in economic parlance) “is a crucial part of the mechanism 
through which the aggregate gains from trade are realized.”178 
Yet despite the critical importance of the labor mobility assumption, 
“[u]ntil recently, the literature had surprisingly little to say about 
[adjustment costs], as it was focused on steady state outcomes” when all 
the switching has already occurred.179 When economists questioned the 
easy switching assumption in the past decade, they discovered that “there 
are substantial barriers to mobility and reallocation,”180 and that “labor-
market adjustment to trade shocks is stunningly slow.”181 Even more 
disturbing is a growing evidence that “low-skilled workers [are] less 
mobile and more sensitive to local shocks.”182 U.S. labor market turned 
out to be not that efficient after all. 
The economic analysis of competition reveals a similar shift in 
economists’ views. Following a highly influential analysis by Arnold 
Harberger published in 1954,183 economists assumed that market power 
is not an economy-wide problem in U.S. product markets.184 Market 
                                                                                                                         
176 “[G]eographical labor mobility is considered to be an efficient adjustment 
mechanism to macroeconomic shocks.” Marco Caliendo et al., The Returns to 
Labor Market Mobility: An Evaluation of Relocation Assistance for the 
Unemployed, 148 J. PUB. ECON. 136, 137 (2017). 
177 See Autor et al., China Shock, supra note 74, at 207-208. 
178 Goldberg, supra note 76, at 19. 
179 Id. at 20. 
180 Id. 
181 Autor et al., China Shock, supra note 74, at 235. How slow? “[L]ocal 
labor force participation rates remain[ ] depressed and local unemployment rates 
remain[ ] elevated for a full decade or more after a shock commences.” Id. 
182 Richard Hornbeck & Enrico Moretti. Who Benefits From Productivity 
Growth? Direct and Indirect Effects of City TFP Shocks on Wages, Rents, and 
Inequality 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24661, 2019), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w24661. If the shock is positive, lower mobility 
may help low-skill workers, as Hornbeck and Moretti show. 
183 See Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. 
ECON. REV. 77 (1954) 
184 See Jan De Loecker & Jan Eeckhout, The Rise of Market Power and the 
Macroeconomic Implications 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 23687, 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23687 (“While there was 
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power is indicative of monopolization—a textbook example of market 
failure. Its absence is a sign that product markets are competitive and 
efficient. 
Yet “[d]espite the vital importance of market power in economics, 
surprisingly little is known about its systematic patterns for the aggregate 
economy and over time.”185 When economists recently considered how 
product markups changed over decades, they found evidence of a 
dramatic increase in market power.186 
Or consider the well-known decline of the labor share since the 
beginning of this century.187 As the share of national income going to 
workers fell, economists suggested that technological change, 
mechanization, capital accumulation, change in the relative price of 
capital, or unobserved intangible capital explained the decline.188 Each 
explanation concluded that the decline was efficient189 and even welfare-
enhancing in the long run.190 Notably, almost all explanations assumed 
that the decline in labor share necessarily meant that the capital share 
increased.191 This assumption came from empirical findings that between 
the 1960’s and 1980’s, the share of economic rents (windfall profits) in 
                                                                                                                         
a tradition to investigate the potential impact of market power on resource 
allocation, the analysis of Harberger (1954) concluded that profit rates across 
US (manufacturing) industries during the 1920s were not sufficiently dispersed 
to generate any meaningful aggregate outcome. This analysis, and its conclusion 
that market power barely impacts economy-wide outcomes, became the default 
view held by many economists and policy makers ever since.”); Naidu et al., 
supra note 111, at 541-42. 
185 De Loecker et al., supra note 111, at 562. 
186 See id. 
187 See Michael D. Giandrea & Shawn A. Sprague, Estimating the U.S. 
Labor Share, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT. MONTH. LABOR REV. 1, 2, 5 (2017), 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2017/article/estimating-the-us-labor-share.htm 
(citing studies considering the causes of the decline). See also David Autor et 
al., Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share, 107 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS 
& PROC. 108, 180 (2017) (“there is consensus that there has been a decline in the 
US labor share since the 1980s, particularly in the 2000s.”); De Loecker et al., 
supra note 111, at 609 (“the decline in the labor share is widely discussed”). 
188 See Barkai, supra note 116, at 2421, 2423.  
189 See Simcha Barkai, Declining Labor and Capital Shares 2 (Working 
Paper, 2017); https://www.london.edu/faculty-and-research/academic-
research/d/declining-labor-and-capital-shares. 
190 See id. at 5-6. 
191 See id. at 4. 
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the U.S. economy was close to zero, as it should be if economy is 
competitive.192 
Even though we are now half a century removed from those decades, 
the zero-profit assumption has persisted until Simcha Barkai abandoned 
it in his recent path breaking work.193 His stark conclusion? Not only did 
the normal return to capital not increase to offset the decrease in the 
labor share, but the capital share declined even more than the labor share 
did. What increased—dramatically—were windfall profits.194 The cause, 
again, is the decline in market competition.195 That this rise improves 
efficiency and welfare is very much in doubt, given that it causes large 
declines in output, wages, and investment.196 
One sees more of the same in other areas of economics. In the 1970’s, 
80’s and 90’s labor markets were viewed as reasonably competitive.197 
Labor economists believed that unions were responsible for the 
remaining labor market rigidity and inefficiency.198 To the extent that 
economists tested the employers’ monopsony power as an alternative 
explanation, the tests were indirect and their persuasiveness was 
limited.199 
Then unions faltered but inefficiencies remained, surprising labor 
economists.200 “The concurrent decline of unions and rise of labor market 
concentration implies that the neoliberal assumption that unions, rather 
                                                      
192 See Barkai, supra note 116, at 2457-58. 
193 See id. at 2459 (“To the best of my knowledge no [aggregate measure of 
pure profits] exists for the past three decades.”). 
194 See id. 2423. 
195 See id. at 2424. 
196 See id. at 2457. 
197 See Naidu et al., supra note 111, at 541-42, 552-53 (noting that 
“economists assumed that labor markets are reasonably competitive, and 
accordingly that labor market power was not an important social problem”). 
198 See Acemoglu et al, supra note 150, at 232 (“The standard view is one in 
which unions are pure rent-seeking organizations. They distort the socially 
optimal allocation of resources and represent and impediment to free contracting 
in the labor market.”); Farber et al., supra note 152, at 5. 
199 See Benmelech et al., supra note 134, at 5-6 (explaining that David Card 
and Alan Krueger inferred monopsony power as a possible explanation of 
employers’ non-responsiveness to an increase in minimum wage, and Michael 
Reich and co-authors made the same inference from the workers’ relatively low 
propensity to leave jobs after wage declines). 
200 See Krueger & Posner, supra note 130, at 4 (referring to monopsonization 
as “a new and perhaps surprising” explanation for wage stagnation and income 
inequality). 
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than employers, are the major source of cartelization of labor markets 
was false.”201  
Naturally, economists have a lot of catching up to do. 
The idea that even highly advanced labor markets, like 
that of the United States, might be better characterized as 
imperfectly competitive opens a host of questions about 
the welfare implications of industrial policies and labor 
market institutions …. Empirical work lags particularly 
far behind the theory in this domain.202 
Next consider the economic analysis of environmental regulation. 
Until recently, most computable general equilibrium models used to 
estimate the effects of environmental regulation assumed full 
employment and perfect labor mobility across industries and regions.203 
Yet evidence suggests that neither assumption is warranted. The 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments, for instance, likely “induced substantial 
mobility costs for affected workers.”204 High mobility costs undermine 
labor market efficiency. 
Macro economists, for their part, were optimistic about the U.S. 
financial system. “At the onset of  the [2008] crisis, the workhorse 
macroeconomic models assumed frictionless financial markets.”205 Then 
the crisis hit, and the prevailing models of “frictionless, perfectly 
competitive, complete information”206 markets were of little use to the 
Federal Reserve and other government agencies trying to contain a 
meltdown of the imperfect, real-world financial system. The same 
models looked detached from reality when it turned out that the most 
important benchmark in the deepest financial market turned out to have 
been manipulated for years, and it was not the only example of major 
                                                      
201 Id. 
202 David Card et al., Firms and Labor Market Inequality: Evidence and 
Some Theory, 36 J. LABOR ECON. S1, S57 (2018) (emphasis supplied). 
203 See Castellanos & Heutel, supra note 169, at 2; Hafstead & Williams, 
supra note 170, at 195. 
204 Castellanos & Heutel, supra note 169, at 3, n.1; Reed W. Walker, The 
Transitional Costs of Sectoral Reallocation: Evidence from the Clean Air Act 
and the Workforce, 128 Q.J. ECON. 1787,  1797 (2013). 
205 Mark Gertler & Simon Gilchrist, What Happened: Financial Factors in 
the Great Recession, 32 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (2018). 
206 John C. Williams, The Rediscovery of Financial Market Imperfections, in 
TOWARD A JUST SOCIETY: JOSEPH STIGLITZ AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
ECONOMICS 201, 201-03 (Martin Guzman ed., 2018). 
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financial market manipulation.207 Understandably, macro economists 
have now moved away from the naively optimistic pre-crisis 
assumptions and beliefs.208 
Emerging from all these observations is an unmistakable trend. For 
decades, trade economists, industrial organization economists, labor 
economists, macro economists, and environmental economists relied on 
rather Panglossian assumptions about the efficiency of U.S. economy. 
Some of these assumptions were probably wrong all along.209 Some were 
valid when made decades ago but remained in use well past their 
expiration date.210 Either way, economists increasingly recognize that 
these assumptions were flawed, and so were the conclusions based on 
these assumptions. Proceeding on parallel tracks, law-and-economics 
scholars have become increasingly skeptical about the claims that the 
common law either is efficient or is developing toward efficiency.211 
* * * * * 
The findings summarized in this Part reveal a sobering picture. Not 
only did many government policies likely gave rise to large, unintended 
economic losses, but these losses fell on the same group of Americans—
low-skill, low-education, pre-retirement age workers. Their obvious 
economic vulnerability makes the recent findings especially troubling. 
Moreover, market failures and other inefficiencies that have been 
growing in various sectors of the U.S. economy diminished American 
                                                      
207 That rate is LIBOR. See Alan Krueger, Reflections on Dwindling Worker 
Bargaining Power and Monetary Policy, Address at the Jackson Hole Economic 
Symposium 1 (Apr. 24, 2018) (remarking that “some of the best finance 
economists in the world thought it inconceivable that foreign exchange markets 
or LIBOR could be manipulated.”), 
https://www.kansascityfed.org/~/media/files/publicat/sympos/2018/papersandha
ndouts/824180824kruegerremarks.pdf?la=en. Both markets were proven to be 
rigged. Id. 
208 See supra, Gertler & Gilchrist, at 4-9. 
209 Assumptions about low switching costs in the economic analysis of trade 
and about unions as the main cause of labor market rigidity come to mind. 
210 An example is the assumption about low windfall profits. 
211 See Richard Craswell, In That Case, What Is the Question? Economics 
and the Demands of Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903, 911 (2003); Anthony 
Niblett et al., The Evolution of a Legal Rule, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 330 
(2010); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three 
Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 830 (2003); D. Daniel Sokol, 
Rethinking the Efficiency of the Common Law, 95 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 795, 
797 (2019). 
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workers’ capacity to avoid or absorb their losses. The next question is 
what, if anything, did the U.S. government do in response. 
IV. GOVERNMENT’S DISTRIBUTIONAL (NON)ADJUSTMENTS  
Congress and the President have the power to create distributional 
burdens, and the power to mitigate them as well. Part III reveals that a 
wide range of national policies likely created unintended burdens. This 
Part shows that the U.S. government did little to mitigate them. Its main 
targeted relief program has been limited and ineffective. Its general 
efforts to address the impacts discussed in Part III have been inadequate. 
To make things worse, the U.S. government’s growing reliance on states 
in administering federal social insurance programs—as well as the U.S. 
government’s reluctance to counter some state-specific policies—
exacerbated the losses resulting from the national policies discussed in 
Part III. These conclusions matter greatly in assessing the two 
distributional arguments at the center of this Article. 
A. Targeted Assistance Programs 
The only significant federal program specifically aimed to counter the 
unintended distributional impacts of a major U.S. policy is the Trade 
Adjustment Assistance program (TAA). The TAA offers cash benefits, 
retraining, and relocation assistance to workers who lost their jobs to 
import competition.212 The idea for the program came from David J. 
McDonald in 1953. McDonald was the president of the United 
Steelworkers union and a member of the presidential Commission on 
Foreign Economic Policy.213 He supported free trade and viewed 
adjustment assistance as a response to the possible (though at that point 
entirely hypothetical) dislocations resulting from trade liberalization. 
Championed by John F. Kennedy since his days as a junior senator from 
Massachusetts, the TAA began operation in 1962. 
In the first six years of TAA existence, the Tariff Commission tasked 
with evaluating petitions for adjustment assistance denied every single 
one. Assistance started flowing after that, but barely. Only forty-six 
                                                      
212 See ALDEN, supra note 7, at 107; Baicker & Rehavi, supra note 62, at 
239-46. TAA was also designed to help U.S. companies affected by foreign 
competition. See ALDEN, supra note 7, at 111. 
213 See ALDEN, supra note 7, at 116. 
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thousand workers received benefits between 1968 and 1973.  Congress 
significantly expanded the program in 1973 with support from the Nixon 
administration. As a result, more than 1.3 million workers qualified for 
TAA benefits between 1975 and 1981. Then the Reagan administration 
cut the program’s funding by seventy five percent. It became almost 
impossible to qualify for benefits,214 and only sixteen thousand workers 
received them in 1981. Participation grew gradually but remained fairly 
low until 2002 when the George W. Bush administration reached a deal 
about its fast-track trade-negotiating authority with Congress. The final 
expansion came as part of President Obama’s stimulus package in 2009. 
So just in the past two decades, participation in TAA went from under 
100,000 in 2000, to 235,000 in 2002,215 to more than 280,000 in 2010.216 
The 2009 expansion was temporary, however.217 By 2017, only 94,000 
workers benefited from the program.218  
These wild fluctuations are not a sign of a stable, reliable program.219 
And given that millions likely lost jobs from the China shock alone,220 
the current level of participation reveals the program’s overwhelming 
inadequacy. This inadequacy is obvious when one looks at the TAA’s 
significance in the lives of affected workers. In the regions most harmed 
by the China shock, for example, TAA payments are “negligible relative 
to many other transfer programs”221 that are not targeted to provide 
specific relief. For a program designed to assist, TAA does not offer 
much assistance. No other major federal program aims at relieving the 
unintended distributional costs of government policies adopted in the 
past half-century. 
                                                      
214 The grant rate dropped from over 80% to just 14%, see id. 
215 See id. at 121-22. 
216 See EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, TRADE 
ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FOR WORKERS PROGRAM, FISCAL YEAR 2017 4 
(2010). 
217 See id. at 2-3. 
218 See id. at 9. 
219 Some of these fluctuations, such as the 2009 expansion, reflect economic 
cycles, but many do not.  
220 See Acemoglu et al., supra note 87, at S141. 
221 Autor et al., China Shock, supra note 74, at 230-31. 
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B. General Social Safety Net Programs 
If the targeted congressional efforts are meager and ineffective, what 
about the general redistributive programs? The Earned Income Tax 
Credit, or EITC, is a major cash transfer program for working 
Americans. Enacted in 1975 and expanded on several occasions most 
recently in 2015,222 it is one of the federal government’s largest 
antipoverty programs. In 2017, it provided about $65 billion to twenty 
seven million workers.223 Notably, Congress significantly expanded the 
EITC in 1993, just as the country was entering into NAFTA and gearing 
up for negotiations that culminated in China’s entry into the WTO.224 
The EITC surely helps low-income American workers. But its design 
undermines the claim that it was intended to—or did—serve as an 
effective distributional adjustment to the government-created economic 
shocks discussed earlier. For the lowest earners, the EITC increases as 
wages rise.225 So if trade liberalization, or labor market monopsony, or 
environmental regulation reduced wages of some workers, their EITC 
payments went down as well. For those earning a bit more, the EITC is a 
fixed dollar amount that would not counteract a decrease in wages.226 
Moreover, the EITC is available in meaningful amounts only to parents 
caring for children (and some other dependents). So neither young single 
workers, nor older workers with children over nineteen, nor workers 
living separately from their children are eligible for benefits. Given the 
breakdown of marriage among low-income Americans,227 the last 
limitation in particular severely limits the reach of the EITC. 
                                                      
222 See Margot L. Crandall-Hollick, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44825, THE 
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC): A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1, 10 
(2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44825.pdf. 
223 See Statistics for Tax Returns with EITC; https://www.eitc.irs.gov/eitc-
central/statistics-for-tax-returns-with-eitc/statistics-for-tax-returns-with-eitc.  
224 See Crandall-Hollick, supra note 222, at 6. 
225 See Elaine Maag, Who Benefits from Expanding the EITC or CTC?, 
Urban Institute (Jul. 30, 2018), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98829/who-benefits-from-
expanding-the-eitc-or-ctc_understanding-the-intersection-of-the-eitc_0.pdf. The 
proportionate relationship between wages and ETIC exists up to earned income 
of $14,290 for a family with two children. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 
I.R.B. 392.  
226 EITC amount remains flat for earned income between $14,290 and 
$24,350 for a family with two children. See id. 
227 See Anne Alstott, Updating the Welfare State: Marriage, the Income Tax, 
and Social Security in the Age of Individualism, 66 TAX L. REV. 695, 720-21 
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Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)228 is another 
federal program that had the potential of relieving some of the economic 
hardship of low-wage stagnation and low-skill job losses. But a crucial 
part of  the ACA—the national Medicaid expansion—was struck down 
by the Supreme Court.229 Twelve states have not expanded Medicaid as 
of September of 2020,230 including some of the states most affected by 
policies discussed in Part III.231 
Other than the EITC, the curtailed ACA, and the ill-fated TAA, there 
has been no significant government program that can be plausibly 
viewed as countering the losses discussed earlier. General anti-poverty 
programs like unemployment insurance, disability insurance, and 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families are surely used by workers 
affected by free trade, labor market monopsony, and so on.232 But a claim 
that any of these programs was adopted in order to mitigate the adverse 
distributional effects discussed here is implausible. In fact, changes to 
some of these programs have made things worse, as the next section 
explains. 
There are several specific employment and training programs that are 
plausibly viewed as assisting low-skill workers regardless of the cause of 
their job losses. These programs are numerous, almost all are poorly 
funded and negligible in effects.233 Many of them do not aim to help 
dislocated workers.234 The largest among those that do is the Workforce 
                                                                                                                         
(2013). 
228 See Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
229 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (finding 
that the ACA’s national expansion of Medicaid exceeded Congress’ 
Constitutional powers). 
230 See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Foundation (April 26, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-
brief/status-of-state-medicaid-expansion-decisions-interactive-map/.  
231 For example, the Carolinas are among the states most affected by the 
China Shock, see Autor, China Shock, supra note 74, at 225, and Kansas and 
large parts of Texas are among areas with the highest employer concentration 
and market power, see Azar et al., supra note 128, at 25. None of these states 
expanded Medicaid. 
232 See Autor, China Shock, supra note 74, at 230. 
233 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO, MULTIPLE 
EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING PROGRAMS: PROVIDING INFORMATION ON 
COLOCATING SERVICES AND CONSOLIDATING ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES 
COULD PROMOTE EFFICIENCIES (2011). 
234 Some programs are focused on youth, on re-integration of ex-offenders, 
on disabled veterans, and so on. See id. at 47. 
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Investment Act / Dislocated Workers program enacted in 1998.235 In 
2009, Congress spent slightly less than $2.5 billion on this program.236 
TAA disbursed about $700,000; National Farmworker Jobs Program 
$80,000.237 Compared to $65 billion of EITC benefits, these are trivial 
amounts. The distressing bottom line is that although politicians have 
been talking about the unintended burdens of free trade, regulation, and 
technological change for decades, they did little to address these burdens. 
C. Making Things Worse 
The federal structure of the U.S. political system, combined with the 
federal government’s increasing reliance on states in administering 
national safety net programs, has made things even worse for low-
income Americans. As Part III explains, many unintended distributional 
losses have been geographically concentrated. Some areas have been 
affected by trade liberalization much more than others. The country’s 
heartland has highly concentrated labor markets while the coasts do not. 
Given this concentration, geographic mobility is crucial for a fast 
dissipation of labor market shocks. 
Yet a number of state policies likely reduced geographic mobility of 
low-skill workers over the past several decades. Restrictive zoning laws 
adopted in many economically thriving locales artificially increased 
housing costs.238 Because these costs consume a larger share of one’s 
budget as income declines, pricey real estate disproportionately affected 
relocation opportunities of low-income Americans 239 
Another barrier has been the proliferation of state-imposed 
occupational licensing and related requirements. Over the past six 
decades, the share of U.S. labor force subject to these requirements grew 
five-fold.240 No longer limited to doctors and lawyers, licensing regimes 
                                                      
235 See Burt S. Barnow & Jeffrey Smith, Employment and Training 
Programs, in 2 ECONOMICS OF MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 127, 132-33, 139  (Robert A. Moffitt ed., 2016). 
236 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 233, at 47. 
237 See id. 
238 See Peter Ganong & Daniel Shoag, Why Has Regional Income 
Convergence in the U.S. Declined?, J. URBAN ECON. 76, 76 (2017); David 
Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE 
L.J. 78, 114 (2017); see also Furman & Orszag, supra note 115, at 29. 
239 See Ganong & Shoag, supra note 238, at 78. 
240 See Peter Q. Blair & Bobby W. Chung, How Much of Barrier to Entry is 
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cover barbers, bartenders, florists, manicurists, and many other relatively 
low-skill professions.241 More than 1,100 occupations are regulated at 
least in one state.242 
Because these licensing restrictions are state-specific, they have a 
negative effect on labor mobility.243 Moreover, according to the first-of-
a-kind recent estimate of the welfare effects of licensing, licensing an 
occupation “reduces total surplus from the occupation, defined as the 
welfare value of trade in its labor services by about 12 percent relative to 
no licensing. Workers and consumers respectively bear about 70 and 30 
percent of these welfare costs.”244 Workers with a only a high-school 
degree are among those most negatively affected.245 
The federal government has done very little to counter these state-
imposed restrictions. So the state-erected barriers to geographic mobility 
of low-skill workers have grown unabated. 
The federal government’s contribution to geographic immobility goes 
beyond mere passivity, however. From welfare to food stamps,246 from 
Medicaid to unemployment insurance, the federal government runs its 
                                                                                                                         
Occupational Licensing? 57 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 919, 919 (2019).  
241 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS & DEP’T OF 




242 See id. at 4. 
243 See Blair & Chung, supra note 240, at 920 (finding that “licensing 
reduces labor supply by an average of 17-27 per cent.”); Janna E. Johnson & 
Morris M. Kleiner, Is Occupational Licensing A Barrier to Interstate 
Migration?, 12 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 347, 350, 366-69 (2020) (finding 
that in general, state licensing has a negative but small effect on interstate 
mobility,  but also discovering that for some occupations such as pest control 
workers and pharmacists that effects are sizeable); Schleicher, supra note 238, at 
120-21 (summarizing the evidence).  
244 Morris M. Kleiner & Evan J. Soltas, A Welfare Analysis of Occupational 
Licensing in the U.S. States 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 26383, 2019), https://www.nber.org/papers/w26383. 
245 Id. at 3. 
246 “Welfare” is the non-technical name for the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families and “food stamps” is the non-technical name for the 
Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL 32748, THE TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) 
BLOCK GRANT: A PRIMER ON TANF FINANCING AND FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS 
(Dec. 14, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32748.pdf. 
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low-income assistance programs through states.247 The 1996 welfare 
reform increased federal-to-state delegation, exacerbating interstate 
differences in benefits, eligibility, and conditions of low-income support 
programs.248 Variation in unemployment benefits—the form of assistance 
of most immediate concern for displaced workers—is nothing short of 
staggering. Minimum earnings requirements for eligibility, for instance, 
range from $130 in Hawaii to $3,400 in Florida.249 The maximum 
weekly benefit is $600 in Massachusetts but only $190 in Mississippi.250 
None of these and related variations are transparent. Complexity and 
heterogeneity of benefits inevitably limits interstate mobility by giving 
rise to uncertainty, hassle, and fear of losing some of the benefits.251 It is 
far from clear that the federal government took these mobility costs into 
account in its decisions to increasingly delegate the administration of the 
federal social safety net programs to the states.252 
* * * * * 
                                                      
247 See Schleicher, supra note 238, at 125-26; see also supra, text 
accompanying notes 25-28. The EITC is a major exception—it is administered 
directly by the federal government. See Gene Falk, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL31768, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 2 (EITC): AN OVERVIEW (Oct. 22, 
2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31768.pdf. 
248 See MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, 
AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 175, 183 (1999). Ryan Nunn et al., 




m=email&utm_content=72429855 (reporting that duration of unemployment 
benefits varies from 12 weeks to 28 weeks depending on the state); Lars J. 
Lefgren et al., Contemporary State Policies and Intergenerational Income 
Mobility 10, 50 Tbl. 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
25896, 2019), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25896 (describing large inter-state 
differences in the generosity of state social safety net programs), 55 J. HUMAN 
RESOURCES (2020) (forthcoming). 
249 See Krueger & Meyer, supra note 22, at 2334. 
250 See id. at 2335. 
251 See Schleicher, supra note 238, at 126-27. This heterogeneity, combined 
with state-specific licensing and restrictive zoning may well explain why inter-
state mobility has been lower than inter-county mobility for the past several 
decades. See Furman and Orszag, supra note 115, at 40-43, although other 
explanations of the same phenomenon exist, see id. 
252 As David Schleicher points out, federal tax subsidies for owner-occupied 
housing may also reduce geographic mobility of low-income home owners. See 
Schleicher, supra note 238, at 127-30. 
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Over the past several decades, the federal government put in place a 
number significant social programs. It enacted the ACA.253 It greatly 
expanded the EITC.254 It added prescription drug coverage to 
Medicare.255 But none of these programs targeted—or especially 
benefitted—low-skill American workers disproportionately 
disadvantaged by the U.S. trade, immigration, competition, and labor 
policies. The program enacted to help some of these workers—the 
TAA—has been singularly unsuccessful. To make things worse, 
Congress’ increasing delegation of social safety net programs to the 
states made it harder for low-skill workers to move across state lines to 
areas of greater economic opportunity. The federal government’s failure 
to intervene as states and local jurisdictions erected additional barriers to 
workers’ movement further exacerbated the problem. Overall, then, U.S. 
distributional policies did little to alleviate the unintended burdens of 
government decisions considered in Part III. Quite likely, some federal 
(as well as state and local) polices added to these burdens instead. 
V. DISTRIBUTIONAL ARGUMENTS, IN REVERSE 
Having reached this point in the discussion, it is easy to compare the 
policy takeaways from the two arguments described in Part II with the 
actual policies discussed in Parts III and IV. The comparison reveals that 
the academic arguments and the actual policies have an uncanny 
resemblance. Legal rules were indeed designed without regard to their 
distributional effects, just as the efficiency-only argument would 
recommend. Congress indeed ignored transitional losses, just as the no-
compensation argument would advise.256 
                                                      
253 See Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
254 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE EARNED INCOME TAX 
CREDIT (EITC): A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1, 6 (2018) (describing the 1993 
expansion). 
255 See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 101-11, 117 Stat. 2066, 2071-76 (offering 
optional prescription drug coverage for Medicare enrollees). 
256 I am not the first one to note stark similarities between major U.S. 
policies enacted by administrations and congressional majorities of both 
political parties over the past four decades and the arguments’ prescriptions. See 
Larry Kramer, Beyond Neoliberalism: Rethinking Political Economy, William & 
Flora Hewlett Foundation 2-3 (2018), https://hewlett.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/Beyond-Neoliberalism-Public-Board-Memo.pdf. 
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This comparison certainly does not amount to a claim that the 
academic arguments caused the actual policies. The U.S. economy and 
the country’s political system are too complex to allow for any such 
causal inference. But the two arguments are important even if they 
merely influenced academic and policy debates. And there is plenty of 
reasons to think that they did.257 Whether such influence is merited going 
forward depends on the plausibility of the arguments’ underlying 
assumptions—the question to which we now turn. 
A. The Efficiency-only argument 
1.  The Tax-and-Transfer Adjustment Assumption 
The first assumption underlying the efficiency-only argument is that 
appropriate distributional adjustments are made through the tax-and-
transfer system. In the absence of unintended distributional shifts, 
“appropriate” simply means viewed as desirable by policymakers at the 
time. If, however, unintended distributional burdens do arise, and if 
policymakers do not view these burdens as desirable, “appropriate” 
adjustments are those that offset such unintended burdens.258 
The discussion in the previous two Parts makes it very likely that 
large burdens did arise. It is also clear that these burdens were not 
intended. This conclusion follows not from a magical insight into 
someone’s state of mind.259 Rather, the burdens were unintended because 
they were unexpected. 
Until the recent wave of empirical research, policymakers had no 
rigorous evidence of the magnitude of the losses described in Part III, 
and little knowledge of some of those losses. This is not to say that there 
were no warnings. Debates about the costs of trade liberalization started 
                                                      
257 See sources cited supra notes 17, 68. 
258 This is exactly what Shavell explained in the passage quoted supra, note 
36. 
259 Arguments about the futility of discovering the intent of individual 
policymakers and entire legislative bodies are well known. See, e.g.¸ Ryan 
Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 980, 986-95 
(2017); Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: 
Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 76 (2012); Peter H. Schuck, 
Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoebroad, 20 CARDOZO L. 
Rev. 775, 777 (1999). 
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shortly after the end of World War II,260 even though the United States 
was close to an autarchy at the time.261  Congress’ concerns about 
distributional effects of market concentration go all the way back to the 
beginning of the twentieth century.262 Protectionist restrictions on 
immigrants’ employment are at least a century-old as well.263 
But speculation and fears should not be confused with evidence. After 
all, the CBO reassured Congress in 1993 that losses from NAFTA would 
be “surprisingly small.”264 At about the same time, the National Research 
Council issued a report on economic and fiscal consequences of 
immigration. The report concluded that “there is only a small adverse 
impact of immigration on the wage and employment opportunities of 
competing native groups.”265 These conclusions gave policymakers little 
cause for concern. Two decades later it turned out that these conclusions 
were over-optimistic. 
If one agrees that the losses from major policies discussed here were 
unintended, can one question whether these losses were objectionable? 
After all, there is no such thing as the ideal distribution of income (or 
wealth, or opportunities) in the economy—ideals are in the eye of the 
beholder. So there is no way to know if any change in distribution is 
desirable from some ideal point of view. Not knowing the baseline, how 
can one evaluate a change? 
Whether this logic persuades one in general, it has little purchase 
when it comes to the evidence presented here. Geographic and industry 
variations are the reason. The China shock hit North Carolina but not 
                                                      
260 See Wilcox, supra note 15, 884-89 (marshalling arguments against the 
view of Secretary of State Dean Acheson that “producers who may suffer from 
increased imports, caused by further reductions in the American Tariff, might be 
compensated in some way by the government.”). 
261 See Alden, supra note 7, at 1-2.  Alden quotes Wikipedia that defines 
autarky as existing “whenever an entity can survive or continue its activities 
without external assistance or international trade.” Id. at 1. 
262 See Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The 
Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. LAW & POL’Y REV. 
235, 278-79 (2017). 
263 See KUNAL M. PARKER, MAKING FOREIGNERS: IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP LAW IN AMERICA, 1600-200 162 (2015). 
264 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF NAFTA: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC MODELS AND OTHER EMPIRICAL STUDIES 61 
(1993). 
265 THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS 
OF IMMIGRATION 236 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997). 
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Nevada.266 U.S. labor markets became concentrated in the heartland but 
not on the coasts.267 There is no plausible argument that prior to the 
China Shock low-skill workers in North Carolina were unjustifiably 
better off than low-skill workers in Nevada; that before labor markets 
became concentrated high school dropouts were doing better in Nebraska 
than in California. Yet only if these disparities indeed existed can one 
suggest that the China Shock or the labor market monopsony have led to 
desirable distributional outcomes by hurting North Carolinian and 
Nebraskan workers who had somehow benefitted from an earlier  
unjustifiable advantage. The argument fails on its face. 
The bottom line, then, is that large losses described in Part III were 
both unintended and undesirable. Given this conclusion, the major policy 
failure of the past several decades has not been choosing the wrong 
policy instrument for distributional adjustments—it has been not making 
sufficient adjustments of any kind. Congress simply failed to offset 
distributional burdens through the legal system or the tax system. The 
tax-and-transfer adjustment assumption failed. 
This Article is not the first one to raise doubts about the realism of 
that assumption. Ronen Avraham, David Fortus, and Kyle Logue pointed 
out that policymakers aiming to implement tax-and-transfer adjustments 
contemplated by the efficiency-only argument “would face an enormous 
informational burden” making such adjustments “virtually impossible to 
implement.”268 Avraham and co-authors offer many reasons supporting 
their conclusion, all conceptual.  Lee Fennell and Richard McAdams 
offered a related critique. For the efficiency-only argument to be 
plausible as a guide to real-world policymaking (what they call 
prescriptive tax superiority), it must be true either that appropriate 
adjustments actually happen through the tax-and-transfer system, or—if 
they do not—that they are equally unlikely to happen through the legal 
system. Fennell and McAdams offered many reasons—again, 
conceptual—why such “invariance” is highly unlikely.269 Richard Revesz 
pointed out that given increasing congressional gridlock, the likelihood 
                                                      
266 See Autor et al., China Shock, supra note 74, at 225. 
267 See Azar et al., supra note 128, at 24. 
268 Avraham et al., supra note 68, at 1130. 
269 These reasons include political inertia, interest group politics, framing, 
and more. See Fennell & McAdams, supra note 17, at 1056. 
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of “continual redistributive tax reforms” implementing the adjustments 
assumed by the efficiency-only argument is implausible.270 
There is some empirical evidence contradicting the tax-and-transfer 
adjustment assumption. Zachary Liscow studied school funding reform 
in Connecticut and concluded that distributional effects of court 
desegregation orders were not offset by changes in that state’s income 
tax.271  
Fennell and McAdams come closest to articulating this Article’s 
critique of the tax-and-transfer adjustment assumption. They argue that 
there is no “evidence that Congress is consistently offsetting 
redistributive legal rules in the real world ….”272 To support this 
conclusion they observe that the “tax–and-transfer system has not 
generally adjusted over time to correct for changes in the national 
income distribution.”273 U.S. Gini coefficient, they point out, rose by 
23% between 1974 and 2012 revealing a large increase in income 
inequality. It is likely that some of this increase is due to changes in legal 
rules rather than other reasons, they argue.274 If so, these (unspecified) 
legal changes created economic burdens that the tax system ignored. 
The efficiency-only argument’s proponents defend the tax-and-
transfer adjustment assumption. As for narrowly-targeted adjustments of 
the kind that Liscow finds lacking, their absence is hardly surprising, 
they remark. 
It remains true that the legislature is not in the business 
of fine-tuning the tax system each time a program is 
enacted or repealed. … [O]ne would not expect tax 
adjustments to offset the [distributive effects of legal 
rules] completely and precisely. Nevertheless, if one had 
to guess, it seems plausible that roughly, on average, and 
over time, changes in [legal rules] will tend to be 
accompanied by tax adjustments that offset changes in 
the distributive incidence of … those [rules].” 275 
                                                      
270 Revesz, supra note 17, at 1520, 21-25. 
271 See Liscow, supra note 32. 
272 Fennell & McAdams, supra note 17, at 1081. 
273 Id. at 1079. 
274 Id. at 1079-82. 
275 Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the 
Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 513, 521 (1996). For other 
statements in the same vein see Fennell & McAdams, supra note 17, at 1076-77. 
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As for congressional gridlock and, more generally, claims that “tax 
system does not, or is unlikely to, change to address distributive 
concerns,” Weisbach argues that these claims are “flat out contradicted 
by the facts.”276 Congress tinkers with the tax code incessantly, “most 
often with great focus on distributional issues,” he explains.277 
Even if only a modest portion of these changes were distributive in 
nature …, the number of [tax-and-transfer] adjustments would be 
high. Blanket assertions that the tax system does not respond to 
distributional concerns are false.278 
There is also some evidence suggesting that distributional adjustments do 
take place sometime.279 
This is the state of play in the academic debate about the practical 
implications of the efficiency-only argument and the realism of the tax-
and-transfer adjustment assumption. Opponents raise theoretical 
objections, identify specific instances where the assumption proved to be 
false, and point to practical realities—congressional gridlock, rise of 
income inequality—that indirectly suggest that the assumption is 
implausible. Proponents counter with theoretical points of their own and 
make equally indirect empirical observations. At the end of the day, even 
the opponents conclude that “[e]mpirically, little is known about whether 
the distributional impacts of various institutions’ policy choices stick.”280  
This Article, as must be clear by now, makes a reaches a very 
different conclusion. A lot—not a little—is known about the stickiness of 
distributional impacts. The Article’s emphasis is on rigorous, wide-
ranging empirical evidence of specific, major distributional burdens, and 
on Congressional failure to implement any significant program that may 
be plausibly viewed as the kind of adjustment that the efficiency-only 
                                                      
276 David A. Weisbach, Distributionally Weighted Cost-Benefit Analysis: 




279 See Richard T. Boylan & Naci Mocan, Intended and Unintended 
Consequences of Prison Reform, 30 J.L. Econ. & Org. 558, 558 (2013) 
(concluding that following court orders requiring states to reduce prison 
overcrowding “correctional expenditure increase and welfare cash expenditures 
decrease …, suggesting that the burden of improved prison conditions is borne 
by welfare recipients.”). 
280 Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1648, 1666 
(2018). 
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argument assumes.281 The failure of the tax-and-transfer adjustment 
assumption, the Article shows, is both more definitive and much more 
dramatic than previously recognized. Over the past several decades, the 
U.S. tax-and-transfer system has ignored unintended losses running in 
the multiple billions of dollars and millions of jobs. So it may or may not 
be true in theory that legal rules should ignore distribution because “there 
is a better method of addressing these concerns.”282 But in practice, that 
better method has not been deployed for decades. This conclusion alone 
is sufficient to set aside the efficiency-only argument as a source of real-
world policy guidance, at least until U.S. policymakers begin to make 
timely and adequate tax-and-transfer adjustments that this argument 
assumes.283 
2.  The Efficient Legal Rules Assumption 
U.S. markets are regulated, and increasingly so.284 Competition law 
and labor law govern product and labor markets. Securities, 
                                                      
281 A working paper by James Sallee bolsters this conclusion. He shows that 
even for a relatively simple legal rule—a Pigouvian tax on gasoline—“it is 
infeasible to create a Pareto improvement from the taxation of goods [subject to 
the Pigouvian tax], and moreover … plausible policies are likely to leave a large 
fraction of households as net losers.” James M. Sallee, Pigou Creates Losers: 
On the Implausibility of Achieving Pareto Improvements from Efficiency-
Enhancing Policies 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
25831, 2019), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25831. Sallee’s analysis offers 
both formal and econometric support for the arguments about the severity of 
policymakers’ informational constraints advanced conceptually by Avraham and 
co-authors. See Avraham et al., supra note 68, at 1130. 
282 Weisbach, supra note 13, at 439.  
283 Joseph Stiglitz, one of the authors of the seminal 1976 article on which 
the efficiency-only argument rests, Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 13, recently 
reached the following conclusion after observing real-world distributional 
effects of actual policies and policymakers’ failure to respond to these effects 
during four decades since the publication of his paper: The “general result in the 
theory of optimal taxation and expenditure [is that] when there are distributive 
effects that cannot be undone by commodity taxes (including type-specific 
factor subsidies), production efficiency is in general not desirable.” Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, Addressing Climate Change Through Price and Non-Price 
Interventions, 119 EUROP. ECON. REV. 594, 603 (2019). Translation: When the 
undesirable distributional effects of legal rules cannot be undone by targeted, 
fully-compensating transfers to the losers, the efficiency-only argument is 
generally not valid. 
284 See, e.g., German Gutiérrez & Thomas Philippon, Declining Competition 
and Investment in the U.S. 55 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
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commodities, and banking regulations control financial markets. U.S. 
trade, environmental, and immigration law—including their 
enforcement—govern their respective domains. According to the 
efficiency-only argument, all these regulatory regimes should ignore 
distributional considerations and focus on efficiency. 
This prescription presumes that all the rules and regulations in 
question actually are efficient or may be made so. Yet as the discussion 
in Part III reveals, it is increasingly clear that this assumption is as 
implausible as the assumption about the tax-and-transfer adjustments. 
The prevailing view among economists appears to have undergone a full 
reversal. Rather than viewing U.S. markets as generally efficient (with 
some residual imperfections), economists now view these markets are 
generally inefficient (with some pockets of efficiency).  
U.S. competition law, it turns out, has failed to prevent the rise of 
monopoly power in product markets and monopsony power in the labor 
market. U.S. labor law has led to the decline of unions without much 
improvement in labor market “rigidities” that unions were thought to 
have caused.285 U.S. financial regulation has failed to prevent not only 
the Great Recession, but flagrant manipulation of major financial 
benchmarks. When legal scholars tested whether common law evolves 
toward efficiency, they came away disappointed as well.286 And one 
hardly needs to comment on the efficiency of U.S. immigration law, as it 
is currently enforced. It is safe to say that, at the very least, the efficiency 
of numerous legal regimes discussed here is in serious doubt. 
So what efficiency should be preserved by directing distributional 
adjustments away from legal rules? Why categorically ignore the likely 
distributional effects of these rules if their efficiency is uncertain and will 
remain so for the foreseeable future? To be sure, efficiency is important 
and pursuing it is essential for economic growth. Some legal rules are 
clearly wasteful and adopting them is not a good idea no matter what 
their distributional effects happen to be. But given the doubts among 
economists and the law-and-economics scholars about the efficiency of 
many legal rules as they exist in the real world, the efficiency-only 
                                                                                                                         
No. 23583, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23583 (summarizing a steady 
increase in the mean number of government regulations governing many 
industries). 
285 See supra, text accompanying notes 198-200. 
286 See supra note 211.  
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argument offers no reason to always disregard distributional 
considerations in pursuit of efficiency benefits. 
3.  The Homogeneity Assumption 
Kaplow and Shavell explain that the advantage of the tax-and-transfer 
system is that it treats individuals based on income—the relevant 
characteristic for distributional purposes. Legal rules, in contrast, are 
“often [ ] confined to the small fraction of individuals who find 
themselves involved in legal disputes … [and there is often] substantial 
income variation within groups of plaintiffs and groups of defendants (so 
that much redistribution will be in the wrong direction).”287 
But the hardships of the China shock, NAFTA, low-skill immigration 
(legal and illegal), and the monopsony power in labor markets are not 
distributed solely based on income. Heterogeneity of individuals that 
Kaplow and Shavell recognized288 and that others emphasized as a 
limitation on their takeaway289 becomes crucially important here. 
Geography and industry, in particular, play a major role. 
A low-skill worker in New England has borne the brunt of Chinese 
competition; a low-skill worker in Oregon has barely noticed it.290 
NAFTA hurt low-income workers in Carolinas much more than in 
Maryland or Montana.291 An income-based tax system is not well-
equipped to deal with these kinds of differences. 
Heterogeneity limits the main takeaway of the efficiency-only 
argument only if it is unobserved. Otherwise, the tax-and-transfer system 
may base distribution on income plus an additional relevant observable 
factor.292 Given that economists had no idea how the China shock would 
play out across the country, or that they did not look for geographically 
uneven effects of monopsony until the past few years, heterogeneity has 
been, indeed, unobserved, often for a long time.  
Thus, if a worker lost a relatively well-paying job to trade 
liberalization and replaced it with two low-paying jobs that generate the 
same total income (while working many more hours), the tax system 
                                                      
287 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 33, at 823. 
288 See id. at 827-29. 
289 See Avraham et al., supra note 68, at 1130-32. 
290 See Autor et al., China Shock, supra note 74, at 225. 
291 See Hakobyan & McLaren, supra note 83, at 735. 
292 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 33, at 827-30. Kaplow and Shavell 
offer blindness as an example of such additional observable factor. 
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would not have recognized this worker as distributionally worse-off 
compared to a similar worker whose job did not move overseas. Yet the 
first worker’s losses may have been even greater than it appears at first 
glance. In addition to losing a better paying job, that worker may have 
lost a generous—and tax-exempt—benefits package, an ability to work 
regular, predictable hours, and job security that came with union 
membership that the worker no longer has. Even beyond these costs, this 
worker may have experienced a loss “of a personal sense of usefulness or 
dignity, loss of a sense of purpose, and loss of coworker 
companionship.”293 Our tax system does not account for the value of any 
of these benefits, so it cannot adjust for the harm of losing them. 
Of course, not knowing the location of unobservable distributional 
costs within income groups makes it difficult to adjust legal rules—not 
just tax rules—to take these costs into account. But in some cases, an 
adjustment to legal rules does have a significant advantage in addressing 
unobserved heterogeneity, as explained in Part V. 
* * * * * 
Nothing in this discussion undermines the efficiency-only argument 
as a matter of theory. This Article takes no position about the arguments’ 
merits if the appropriate distributional changes are indeed made in the 
tax-and-transfer system, if legal rules are indeed efficient, and if there is 
no unobserved within-income-group heterogeneity. Nor does this Article 
assert that there has never been a tax-and-transfer adjustment of a kind 
that the efficiency-only argument recommends, that not a single actual 
legal rule is efficient, or that there is always heterogeneity within income 
groups. The Article does conclude, however, that in many cases of great 
economic and social importance, one, two, or all three assumptions 
underlying the efficiency-only argument fail to hold. So for real-world 
policymaking purposes, one would be wise to appreciate the argument’s 
conceptual insights, and then immediately proceed to considering actual 
distributional adjustments to both legal rules and the tax-and-transfer 
system in light of the unintended distributional effects of major 
government policies. 
                                                      
293 Revesz, supra note 17, at 1518. 
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B. The No-Compensation Argument 
1.  The Private Risk Mitigation Assumption 
In its essence, the no-compensation argument is a judgment about the 
advantage of private ordering over government regulation. In advancing 
the argument, Kaplow by no means ignores the individual’s need to 
insure against a variety of risks present in a market economy, including 
the risk of changes in government policy. At the same time, the argument 
is sensitive to the well-known incentive problems that insurance brings—
adverse selection and moral hazard.294 After comparing the risk of losses 
from legal transitions to other risks that individual face, Kaplow 
concludes that there is no fundamental difference between the two. “The 
prevailing assumption in our society that market solutions for allocating 
risk are preferable to government remedies is therefore equally 
applicable when the risks to be allocated arise from legal transitions,”295 
he concludes. The market solutions that Kaplow has in mind are private 
insurance and financial diversification.296 
Given this reasoning, one clearly sees the limits of the argument. If 
people do not (or cannot) anticipate the costs of future government 
actions, the negative ex ante incentive effects of government 
compensation disappear. If losses are large, concentrated, and born by 
low-wealth individuals, risk mitigation is particularly important.297 And 
if private insurance does not exist and financial diversification is 
unavailable, the government should step in. 
All of these caveats apply to the distributional effects of the 
government policies discussed in Part III. To start, private risk mitigation 
is, indeed, unavailable for the risks of unemployment, wage stagnation, 
skill obsolescence, and poverty. Kaplow recognizes this, and he mentions 
government programs such as social security, unemployment insurance, 
and general income maintenance that protect millions of Americans from 
adverse market outcomes.298 But he explains that “such programs are the 
exception in the vast universe of market risks.”299 While this is true as far 
                                                      
294 See Kaplow, supra note 14, at 520. 
295 Id. at 520. 
296 See id. at 540-41. 
297 See id. at 596. 
298 See id. at 535, n.72. 
299 Id. at 535. Indeed, as Kaplow says, “there is no general government 
compensation for new products that fail, production facilities that prove more 
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as it goes, risks of unemployment, wage stagnation, and skill 
obsolescence—and the government’s failure to mitigate them—turned 
out to be of first-order economic and political importance. 
Not only market-based risk mitigation is unavailable for the particular 
market risks discussed here, but private insurance is not available for just 
about any risk of legal change. Shavell recently considered the question 
thoroughly and confirmed what others noted earlier based on weaker 
evidence: with some minor exceptions not relevant here, legal risks are 
uninsurable.300 Without government intervention, losses from legal 
change lie where they fall. But if no private insurance is available, the 
logic of the no-compensation argument points toward social insurance 
rather than away from it. 
Kaplow himself mentions that social insurance may have an 
advantage over private insurance if different individuals have different 
ability to diversify or insure,301 or if adjustment costs are high.302 
Discussing the subject briefly, he “does not explore how significant these 
issues are in practice, or in what contexts they are most important.”303 
The context he generally considers is the effect of legal transitions on 
businesses and investors.304 Subsequent literature on legal transitions 
generally retains this focus.305 
                                                                                                                         
costly than anticipated, or people who earn less than they had expected due to a 
variety of unfortunate circumstances.” Id. at 535. 
300 See Steven Shavell, Risk Aversion and the Desirability of Attenuated 
Legal Change, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 366 (2014). Jonathan Masur and 
Jonathan Nash reached a similar conclusion and summarized earlier work. See 
Masur & Nash, supra note 62, at 406-410, 416, 421. 
301 In Kaplow’s discussion, this difference arises, for example, because 
“certain individuals lack the information to use such markets to diversify risks 
created by the possibility of changes in government policies.” Kaplow, supra 
note 14, at 550. 
302 See id. at 592 n.254. 
303 Id. at 550.  
304 “Of course, a substantial range of government reforms have their primary 
economic impact—in terms of transitions losses—on corporations and regular 
investors, actors presumably best able to take advantage of market 
arrangements.” Id. at 550. See also id. at 527, 537, 540, 548-49, 596, and 
elsewhere throughout the article. Even when Kaplow discusses trade 
liberalization he focuses on transitional losses incurred by businesses, not 
workers. See Louis Kaplow, Transition Policy: A Conceptual Framework, 13 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 162, 180 (2003). 
305 See Barbara Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123, 
158-59 (2003); Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and 
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Shifting attention to low-skill, low-education workers whose ability to 
insure their human capital or to diversify in financial markets is not just 
limited but altogether non-existent highlights the limits of the no-
compensation argument. When markets offer no risk mitigation, it can 
only come from the government. 
Another reason for government insurance of transition losses is the 
“probability misperception.”306 Kaplow suggests that some “less 
sophisticated (often, less wealthy) individual investors” may lack 
incentives and skills to make proper risk assessments, leading them to 
underinsure in private markets.307 Low-skill workers are even less 
financially sophisticated than less wealthy investors are. Risk 
assessments that these workers make are even less reliable. So there is an 
even stronger reason to mitigate transitional losses of these workers. 
Kaplow views probability misperception as “the strongest case for 
some government response” to transitional losses,308 preferably in the 
form of compulsory government insurance.309 When probability is 
unknown rather than misperceived, when even policy experts and 
government agencies fail to anticipate the effects of their policies, the 
case for a subsequent government intervention is even stronger. And 
given that the government finances its social safety net programs through 
(compulsory) income and payroll taxes, we already have a compulsory 
insurance mechanism in place.310 
Finally, Kaplow recognized that “more concentrated gains or losses 
would present a stronger case for corrective action.”311  Michael Graetz 
viewed the magnitude of transitional losses as the main reason to offer 
relief as well.312 Losses discussed in this Article are both large and 
                                                                                                                         
Legal Process, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211, 213, 225-27 (2003) 
(distinguishing corporations from individual investors because only the latter are 
subject to cognitive biases); Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 17, at 1158 n.12 
(“we deal only with transitional rules applicable to investments”). 
306 Kaplow, supra note 14, at 548. 
307 See id. at 548-49. 
308 Id. at 548. 
309 See id. at 549. 
310 I am not arguing that this mechanism currently reflects the appropriate 
premiums (whatever “appropriate” means in this context). I only point out that 
the mechanism itself is already in place. 
311 Kaplow, supra note 14, at 596. 
312 See Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in 
Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 87 (1977); see also Michael J. 
Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1826 (1985). Graetz’ 
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concentrated. So they present a particularly compelling case for 
government assistance. 
In sum, the theoretical argument against the government’s mitigation 
of transitional losses does not apply to the policies discussed here on the 
argument’s own terms. No private risk mitigation is available. Even if it 
were available, probability misperceptions are likely to be severe. The 
relevant probabilities may be unknown altogether. In sum, all key 
assumptions underlying the no-compensation argument do not hold for 
the momentous legal transitions discussed in this Article. 
This conclusion about the no-compensation argument is new to the 
literature. In retrospect, this may seem surprising. Kaplow was well-
aware that risky investments in capital include investments in human 
capital,313 and that some losses should be insured by government because 
no private alternative is available.314 Yet he did not view these issues as 
affecting his overall conclusion. 
Kaplow’s assumptions have been questioned by others. Scholars 
pointed out that private insurance is not available in specific markets and 
circumstances, such as for land takings,315 retroactive changes to 
protected rights316 and statuses,317 and so on. The entire 2003 issue of the 
Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues was dedicated to the analysis of 
legal transitions.318 Yet none of the nine contributors to the issue (ten, 
including Kaplow himself), nor any other scholars writing about legal 
transitions, raised the objections made here. What explains this 
omission? 
                                                                                                                         
reason to compensate taxpayers suffering large losses is political expediency of 
allowing for some compensation in order to enact otherwise desirable changes, 
id. In his most recent work Graetz argues for a  broad-based transition assistance 
program similar to the one suggested here. See MICHAEL GRAETZ & IAN 
SHAPIRO, THE WOLF AT THE DOOR: THE MENACE OF ECONOMIC INSECURITY 
AND HOW TO FIGHT IT (2020).  
313 See Kaplow, supra note 14, at 516 n.7. 
314 See id. at 535. 
315 See Lawrence Blume and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for 
Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 592-97 (1984). 
316 See Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, 
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1795 (1991) (doubting 
availability of insurance for retroactive invalidation of police investigative 
techniques). 
317 See Fisch, supra note 17, at 1090 (questioning availability of insurance 
for retroactive repeals of sovereign immunity of public officials). 
318 See 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1-311 (2003). 
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A book published in 2003 by a distinguished economist Robert 
Shiller suggests the answer. The book advocated a major reform of U.S. 
social insurance to address the multiplicity of new risks facing 
individuals in a modern capitalist economy. This multiplicity made it 
impossible for the government or private markets to offer insurance 
tailored to each specific risk, Shiller explained.319 So a new general 
insurance scheme was needed. 
To bolster his argument, Shiller offered a long list of possible threats 
to individuals’ livelihoods. A country’s national income, he wrote, may 
fall due to population growth, due to changes in monetary policy, energy 
prices, returns to social capital, returns to educational investment, public 
confidence in the economy, and so on.320 Of course, there are individual 
career risks as well.321 
Having considered this long list or risks, the closest Shiller came to 
mentioning the risk of adverse distributional impacts discussed in Part III 
were the risks of “fluctuations in the strength of cartels, or to changes in 
public support of labor unions.”322 He cited a 1986 article about super-
game-theoretic model of price wars for the former, and evidence from 
the Great Depression for the latter.323 Shiller also discussed immigration, 
acknowledging that it can “frustrate the efforts [of] any … one country to 
manage the distribution of income within its borders.”324 He paned the 
U.S. immigration regime of strict laws and lax enforcement as “crazy.”325 
But his takeaway was a proposal for auctioning immigration rights, not a 
call for assisting American workers disadvantaged by the government’s 
“crazy” immigration policy. 
Shiller is a Nobel laureate in economics who is deeply interested in 
social insurance. His lack of awareness of the market distortions and 
distributional burdens discussed in Part III was the sign of time. Just 
seventeen years ago, one of the best economists in the world—and the 
one with great empathy for the plight of those struggling to succeed in 
                                                      
319 See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 58-59 (2003). 
320 See id. at 60-61. 
321 Shiller offers an example of a risk of being drafted in the army during the 
war. See id. at 60. 
322 Id. at 63-65. 
323 See id. 
324 Id. at 159. 
325 Id. 
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the modern U.S. economy—simply did not see the losses that the 
government decisions were imposing on these very people. Today these 
losses are impossible to ignore. And their existence surely limits the 
plausible scope of the no-compensation argument.326 
2.  The Arbitrariness Assumption 
Addressing the theoretical analysis of legal transitions does not end 
the discussion of the no-compensation argument. Theory aside, what if 
the practical obstacles to compensating transitional losers are 
insurmountable? This is precisely what many have argued about the most 
significant U.S. transitional assistance program, the TAA. 
These arguments have merit. The TAA does raise difficult line-
drawing questions. Scholars and policy experts flagged them before the 
program was enacted, and these questions persisted ever since.327 It 
turned out to be very difficult to delineate people and companies who 
suffered from trade liberalization enough to justify government 
assistance, to determine the form of that assistance, and to decide on the 
program’s generosity. More fundamentally, TAA’s defenders never 
articulated a convincing explanation for why the government should help 
only those who suffered from free trade—and not other government 
decisions and private market shifts. 
But all these objections to transitional assistance are largely beside 
the point today. As Part III reveals, it was not only U.S. trade policy that 
unintentionally harmed low-skill American workers. Widespread labor 
                                                      
326 Steven Shavell offers another reason why the no-compensation argument 
does not always hold. When the legal rule is of a threshold-type (also known in 
the law-and-economic literature as negligence, fault-based, or, in Shavell’s 
article in question, a legal standard), and if the private parties were required to 
make lasting investments in order to satisfy the threshold and avoid liability, 
grandfathering or some other form of transition assistance is socially desirable. 
But if the relevant legal regime is that of strict liability, the no-compensation 
argument holds. See Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, 
and Grandfathering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 37 (2008). Shavell’s argument does not 
inform the present analysis of the transitional issues. Workers affected by free 
trade, for example, were not told by the government, on the pain of legal 
sanctions, to acquire human capital in auto or textile industry (impacted by trade 
liberalization) rather than nursing or primary education (that was impacted very 
little). So in the relevant sense, the legal regime governing the decisions of these 
workers is that of a strict liability type. 
327 See Hornbeck, supra note 24, at 2; ALDEN, supra note 7, at 116-22; 
Masur & Nash, supra note 62, 441-42; Wilcox, supra note 15, at 884-89. 
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market monopsony resulting from weak enforcement of U.S. competition 
laws likely harmed these workers as well. The same is likely true of the 
U.S. labor policy, immigration policy, and environmental regulation. So 
a targeted adjustment program of the future needs much less targeting 
compared to the TAA. Rather than separating workers harmed by free 
trade from those harmed by other government decisions discussed here, 
this program would need to target low-skill workers as a group. Such 
broad targeting would not suffer from the arbitrariness embedded in the 
TAA, eliminating the remaining support for the no-compensation 
argument. 
* * * * * 
To be clear, the critique of the no-compensation argument offered 
here is broad by not boundless. The Article does not assert that the 
assumptions underlying this argument always fail. What the Article does 
claim, however, is that these assumptions proved to be implausible in an 
economically, socially, and politically important case of unintentional 
transitional losses imposed on low-skill American workers by the 
government policies discussed in Part III. For these workers, the logic of 
no-compensation argument calls for substantial government assistance. 
VI. POLICY DIRECTIONS 
If policymakers ever viewed the efficiency-only and no-compensation 
arguments as constraining actual policy choices, the discussion in the 
previous Part should remove these constraints. Yet if policymakers were 
to start considering how to reflect distribution in the design of legal rules 
and how to structure transition relief, questions would immediately arise. 
What legal rules should be tested for distributional impacts? How do 
distributionally-motivated adjustments to legal rules look like? And what 
adjustments should be made to the tax-and-transfer system to provide 
transition relief? This Part suggests that in principle, these questions may 
be answered. Details of policy design are beyond the Article’s scope. 
A. Attention to Distribution 
If policymakers decide to pay more attention to distributional effects 
of their policies, they would need to determine which policies to 
scrutinize. This Article’s discussion suggests two answers. 
First, distributional concerns should loom large if the efficiency 
benefits of a policy are small or questionable, and if significant 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3692798
2020]             DISTRIBUTIONAL ARGUMENTS, IN REVERSE 69 
 
distributional effects are possible. State occupational licensing 
requirements are a clear example of legal rules of questionable 
efficiency.328 Federal antitrust authorities’ acquiescence (until recently) 
in proliferation of non-compete agreements—especially for low-skill 
workers—is another example.329 Land-use restrictions are also highly 
suspect.330  
Second, policymakers should consider distributional impacts of some 
policies that are likely to be socially beneficial overall. If these policies 
do not aim to redistribute, if they have a known potential to produce 
significant winners and losers, and if there is great uncertainty about the 
magnitude and location of the resulting gains and losses, distribution 
should enter the analysis. Trade liberalization is an obvious example of 
such policy; environmental regulation may well fit the description as 
well. Sometimes, it may be unclear whether a particular policy fits this 
description. But some important policies surely do, and policymakers 
should monitor their distributional impacts closely both when enacting 
them and over time. 
B. Distributionally-Informed Legal Rules 
Having identified the types of legal rules that should be potentially 
adjusted on account of their distributional impacts, what kinds of 
adjustments should policymakers consider? 
For the rules in the first category, the adjustments are straightforward. 
If state-specific occupational licensing, local land-use regulations, and 
non-compete agreements are borderline efficient (at best), policymakers 
should decrease the licensing coverage, eliminate some land-use 
restrictions, and restrict or ban non-competes. The federal government 
has many ways of intervening to achieve these goals. It can reform U.S. 
                                                      
328 See supra, text accompanying notes 243-245. 
329 See Krueger & Posner, supra note 130, at 7-8. Non-compete agreements 
that bind low-skill workers are especially problematic for three reasons. First, 
they reduce geographic mobility of these workers who are already immobile due 
to financial demands of relocations. Second, given financial and educational 
constraints, low-skill workers are particularly unlikely to obtain legal advice that 
would inform them that many of non-competes are not legally bindings. Third, 
the standard justifications of these agreements as protecting employers’ 
investments in employees and sharing of valuable information with employees 
do not apply for low-skill workers. Id. 
330 See Furman & Orszag, supra note 328, at 26-29; Ganong & Shoag, supra 
note 238, at 76-79; Schleicher, supra note 238, 114-17. 
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competition law and enforcement,331 preempt state licensing schemes, 
induce interstate compacts harmonizing them, or even threaten antitrust 
action against uncooperative states.332 Congress can influence state and 
local zoning policies as well.333 The larger the distributional losses in 
question, the greater should be the burden of demonstrating the 
efficiency gains of policies that impose these losses.334 
 Changes to policies in the second category—those that generally are 
socially beneficial even if distributionally problematic—are not as 
obvious. This Article suggests that slowing down the pace of change is 
one possibility. A more gradual trade liberalization, or a slower 
relaxation of antitrust enforcement would have softened the impacts 
described in Part III and would have given academic and policymakers 
time to identify these impacts. Moreover, these kinds of adjustments to 
legal rules would have made later tax-and-transfer system adjustments 
more informed and more effective. 
Note that in order to slow trade liberalization or to relax antitrust 
enforcement more gradually Congress only needs to recognize the 
possibility of distributional concerns. If future distributional impacts are 
highly uncertain (including the uncertainty about unobserved within-
income-group heterogeneity), recognizing the possibility of distributional 
impacts is the best Congress can do for some time. In contrast, Congress 
cannot deploy offsetting distributional adjustments through the tax-and-
transfer system until Congress has a good idea of who suffered and how 
much. That knowledge emerges only after a delay. So there is a clear 
tradeoff between possibly more efficient but delayed tax-and-transfer 
adjustments and possibly less efficient but timely distributional 
adjustments to legal rules. 
In thinking about this tradeoff, it is important to keep in mind that the 
delayed adjustments through the tax system may be not only untimely, 
but impossible (or grossly inadequate). To take a stark example, what tax 
                                                      
331 See Krueger & Posner, supra note 130, at 12-13 (suggesting reforms of 
competition law); Schleicher, supra note 238, 150-54  
332 See Schleicher, supra note 238, at 121-22, 151 (discussing federal 
government’s ability to diminish state licensing and zoning regulation). 
333 See id. at 151. 
334 For instance, Barkai concludes that “the value of this increase in pure 
profits amounts to over $1.2 trillion in 2014, or $14.6 thousand for each of the 
approximately 81 million employees of the nonfinancial corporate sector.” 
Barkai, supra note 116, at 2423. Distributional shifts of this magnitude surely 
deserve Congressional attention. 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3692798
2020]             DISTRIBUTIONAL ARGUMENTS, IN REVERSE 71 
 
or transfer program would compensate today a worker who lost his job 
due to the China shock fifteen years ago? What if this worker got 
depressed, divorced, and addicted to opioids?335 Distributional 
adjustment through the tax system may come so late that it would be, 
indeed, “too late to compensate the losers.”336 
Needless to say, temporizing policy changes has its own costs. 
Delaying socially beneficial changes defers their benefits. It is more 
difficult to identify causal effects of small changes compared to large 
ones econometrically. Gradual changes require constant action by the 
government—a challenge in our system of checks and balances.337 
These concerns are real, but not determinative. NAFTA tariff 
reductions, for instance, could have been phased in—or phased in more 
slowly—without any additional legislation or budget negotiations.338 The 
same is true of the loosening of antitrust enforcement. The executive 
could have varied the timing of tariff reductions across the country as 
well, allowing economists to measure the differential effects. These are 
just some examples. On the other hand, experience shows that even a 
dramatic change such as the China shock would not force policymakers 
to act if they are unwilling do so. 
Notably, Graetz, Kaplow, and Shavell all mentioned slowing down 
the rate of legal change as a possible response to government-induced 
distributional losses. Shavell suggested recently that legal change should 
be “attenuated,” including through a delayed or gradual implementation 
                                                      
335 These are not mere hypotheticals. See generally NICHOLAS EBERSTADT, 
MEN WITHOUT WORK: AMERICA’S INVISIBLE CRISIS (2016). 
336 Dani Rodrik, Too Late to Compensate Free Trade’s Losers, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE (Apr 16, 2017), http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-
Ed/2017/04/16/Too-late-to-compensate-free-trade-s-
losers/stories/201704160069. 
337 Note also that compensating transitional losers by temporizing legal 
change affects the source of compensation. Immediate legal reform followed by 
compensating transitional losers from general revenues disperses the burden of 
paying compensation among all taxpayers. Slower legal reform places the 
burden of compensating the losers on putative winners whose benefits from the 
slower reform are delayed. See Joseph J. Cordes & Burton A. Weisbord, When 
Government Programs Create Inequities: A Guide to Compensation Policies, 4 
J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 178, 187 (1985). 
338 Some of NAFTA’s tariff elimination provisions were indeed phased in. 
See M. Angeles Villarreal & Ian F. Fregusson, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R42965, THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) 17 (2017), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42965.pdf. 
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of new laws, after concluding that private insurance against legal change 
does not exist.339 Graetz explained that if losses are large, “efficiency and 
fairness concerns may suggest that phased-in or delayed effective dates 
be often used to mitigate the impact.”340 Kaplow concluded that slowing 
the pace of change would be less efficient than letting private markets 
operate without government interference.341 Yet he also mentioned that 
this conclusion may change if different individuals have different ability 
to diversify or insure,342 or when adjustment costs are high.343 
We now know that it would be difficult to overstate the significance 
of the concerns just mentioned for low-skill American workers. Thus, 
slowing down the pace of legal change is an option that should be on the 
table in appropriate cases. This conclusion is another example of the 
Article’s overarching claim. Once the assumptions underlying the two 
distributional arguments are changed to reflect reality, the arguments’ 
objections to distributionally-sensitive legal rules turn to 
endorsements.344 
C. Transitional Assistance and Uniform Social Insurance 
Changing legal rules on account of distribution may be good policy 
sometime, but there is little doubt that the tax-and-transfer system should 
do much of the work. This Article’s analysis points to two directions for 
reforming that system. 
First, the country needs a broad-based, well-funded, federally-
administered (that is, nationally uniform) transitional assistance program 
for low-skill workers. This is hardly a new idea. Whether offered as a 
                                                      
339 See Shavell, supra note 300, at 368, 394. 
340 Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income 
Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 87 (1977); see also Michael J. Graetz, 
Retroactivity Revisited, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1826 (1985) (stating that 
“phased-in or delayed effective dates should often be used instead of 
grandfathering to mitigate particularly large losses that result from changes in 
the law.”).  
341 See Kaplow, supra note 14, at 592 (discussing phase-ins). 
342 In Kaplow’s discussion, this difference arises, for example, because 
“certain individuals lack the information to use such markets to diversify risks 
created by the possibility of changes in government policies.” Kaplow, supra 
note 14, at 550. 
343 See id. at 592 n.254. 
344 For different suggestions of how to reflect distributional considerations in 
the design of legal rules, see Liscow, supra note 280, at 1698-1700. 
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reform of unemployment insurance,345 or as a stand-alone program,346 
transitional assistance for blue collar workers has been proposed and 
discussed for decades.347 The Article’s contribution is to demonstrate that 
given the recent developments in the U.S. economy, the no-
compensation argument, including its arbitrariness prong, does not apply 
to such a broad-based program. 
Second, if Congress decided to alleviate the hardships that it has 
unintentionally imposed on blue-collar American workers, it would need 
to reform American social insurance system in the direction that is the 
exact opposite of what Congress has been doing in recent decades. 
Rather than devolving authority to design various parts of American 
social safety net to the states, Congress needs to reclaim this authority 
and make this safety net simpler, more transparent, and nationally 
uniform. 
There is now strong evidence that Congressional policies have led to 
many local labor market shocks. There is growing evidence that these 
shocks are large and persistent. Given that low-skill workers do not 
relocate to where opportunities are, facilitating geographic mobility of 
these workers is an obvious avenue for improvement. A system where 
the federal unemployment insurance scheme, to take one example, 
“results in essentially 53 different programs” with vastly different 
requirements and benefits is indefensible.348 
All reform directions suggested here give rise to tradeoffs, and no 
single policy dominates the rest. So the final policy suggestion is that 
                                                      
345 See ALDEN, supra note 7, at 119, 122 (summarizing President Nixon’s 
and President Obama’s proposals). 
346 For a recent proposal see GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 312; ISABEL 
SAWHILL, THE FORGOTTEN AMERICANS: AN ECONOMIC AGENDA FOR A DIVIDED 
NATION 108-27 (2018) (proposing a “GI Bill” for American workers). 
347 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR’S 
TASK FORCE ON ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND WORKER DISLOCATION (Dec. 
1986) (urging new national institutions to “address the needs of dislocated 
workers”); The Statement of Findings and Purpose, S. Rep. No. 651, 87th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1961), as quoted in Richard A. Givens, The Search for an Alternative 
to Protection, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 40 n.125 (1961); Ronald J. Daniels & 
Michael Trebilcock, A Better Way to Help U.S. Victims of Free Trade, 
Bloomberg (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2016-
12-02/a-better-way-to-help-u-s-victims-of-free-trade (urging better work 
training, rationalizing multiple federal programs, improving TAA, and greater 
spending for all of these purposes). 
348 Whittaker & Isaacs, supra note 26. 
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policymakers should pursue solutions in all directions at the same time. 
A major benefit of this multi-prong approach is that success of one type 
of response will alleviate the pressure to succeed in others. If social 
insurance and public assistance become more generous and more 
nationally uniform leading to a greater geographic mobility of low-skill 
workers and lowering their adjustment costs, the transition assistance 
program and a slower legal change would become less important.349 If 
policymakers design a highly effective transition assistance program for 
blue-collar workers, the need to temporize legal change and to reform the 
general safety net would diminish.350 Not all suggestions made here are 
interconnected in this way,351 but many are, and pursuing all of them will 
increase the overall chance of success. 
VII. THE THREE OBJECTIONS 
The policy approaches just discussed are general, and they are general 
by design. There are many thoughtful, detailed policy proposals 
consistent with the approaches suggested here, and there have been many 
such proposals over time.352 But even this Article’s general suggestions 
                                                      
349 Arguably, this approach reflects the social policy in Nordic countries. See 
Michael Cembalest, Lost in Space: The Search for Democratic Socialism in the 
Real World, and How I Ended Up Halfway Around the Globe From Where I 
Began, Eye on the Market (June 24, 2019), 
https://am.jpmorgan.com/gi/getdoc/1383625713370. 
350 The design of such effective programs still eludes policymakers around 
the globe. See, e.g., Esther Duflo, The Economic as Plumber, 107 AM. ECON. 
REV. PAPERS & PROC. 1 (2017) (describing the disappointing results of a 
rigorous test of a well-thought-out French reform of unemployment insurance); 
Daynard S. Manoli et al., Long-Term Effects of Job-Search Assistance: 
Experimental Evidence Using Administrative Tax Data 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 24422, 2018), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24422 (reporting a limited success of  recent a 
state job-search assistance program, comparing it to even smaller effects of 
earlier similar efforts). 
351 If, for instance, the government is choosing between two possible legal 
rules that it believes to be roughly equally efficient, the government should 
prefer the rule with better distributional consequences whatever happens to the 
general safety net, transitional assistance programs, and so on. 
352 Some examples include GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 312 (discussing a 
broad transition assistance program); GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 22 
(offering detailed proposals for improving U.S. social safety net, including 
unemployment insurance); Revesz, supra note 17, at 1566-72 (arguing that 
incorporating distributional considerations into the analysis of environmental 
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to adjust legal rules and the tax-and-transfer system on account of the 
unintended distributional impacts of some government policies are likely 
to give rise to equally general objections. Without a claim to 
comprehensiveness, this Part takes on several of them. 
A. Distributional Impacts Are Too Uncertain 
The first objection is that the uncertainty about the future unintended 
distributional consequences of government policies is so great, and our 
knowledge of distributional impacts is so speculative, that no 
distributional adjustments are possible in practice. A shorter version of 
this argument is that U.S. policymakers cannot do any better in the future 
than they have done in the past. 
Distributional changes are indeed difficult to access and even more 
difficult to predict. Evaluating distributional impacts simply requires 
more information than forecasting future economic growth, employment 
interest rates, revenues, and so on.  
Say we want to study the distributional impact of the China Shock. 
First, we need to develop a model that would predict the consequences: 
what production (if any) moves to China; what production (if any) moves 
to the United States? Second, we would need to estimate this model 
empirically, finding the relevant magnitudes and elasticities. But these 
findings would not be nearly enough to determine distributional impacts. 
As Autor and colleagues explain, we would also need to determine 
 [t]o what extent are trade-induced industry employment 
contractions offset by employment gains elsewhere in 
the U.S. economy, potentially outside of trade-impacted 
regions? Do trade adjustments occur on the employment 
margin, the wage margin, or both? … Are the costs of 
trade adjustment borne disproportionately by workers 
employed at trade-impacted firms and residing in trade-
                                                                                                                         
regulation is a reachable goal); SAWHILL, supra note 346, at 108-29 (suggesting 
transitional assistance for workers and a social security reform); PLACE-BASED 
POLICIES FOR SHARED ECONOMIC GROWTH, THE HAMILTON PROJECT (Jay 
Shambaugh & Ryan Nunn eds., 2018) (discussing place-based strategies); 
Krueger & Posner, supra note 130, at 12-13 (proposing reforms to reduce labor 
market monopsony). 
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impacted local labor markets? Or do these shocks diffuse 
nationally, thus moderating their concentrated effects?353 
To answer these questions, we would need to find out what happens 
up and down the supply chains both in the industries directly affected by 
foreign competition and, crucially, in the industries that are relatively 
unaffected by that competition but benefit from cheaper inputs resulting 
from it. We would also need to consider the possible effects on 
productivity354 and on consumer prices.355 If consumers gain, we would 
need to compare these gains to losses resulting from disappearing jobs 
and stagnant wages. This is not the full list of questions that would need 
to be answered to determine all distributional impacts of free trade.356 
Or consider distributional consequences of monopoly power. To 
understand them, researchers would first need to determine whether this 
power exists and to what extent—not a trivial task. But this would only 
begin the analysis. Market power allows firms to earn windfall returns. 
When the U.S. Department of Treasury makes distributional estimates, it 
assigns all such returns to owners of capital (shareholders).357 So it would 
seem that greater market power necessarily benefits the wealthy. But 
several studies suggest that European workers capture a significant share 
                                                      
353 Autor et al., China Shock, supra note 74, at 222-23. 
354 In particular, would productivity be affected at all? If so, in what sectors, 
and through what channels? All of this is still unclear. See id. at 228. 
355 Pablo Fajgelbaum and Amit Khandelwal, for example, argue that gains 
from trade disproportionately benefit the poor because poor consumers spend 
relatively more on cheap imported goods. See Pablo D. Fajgelbaum & Amit K. 
Khandelwal, Measuring the Unequal Gains from Trade, 131 Q.J. ECON. 1113, 
1116-17 (2016). 
356 For example, what if competition with China boosts U.S. innovation, 
eventually benefitting both U.S. workers and U.S. consumers? See Autor et al., 
China Shock, supra note 74, at 228-29. 
357 See TREASURY’S DISTRIBUTIONAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS 2 (November 12, 
2015) (“The share of the corporate income tax that represents a tax on 
supernormal returns is assumed to be borne by shareholders.”), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-
analysis/Documents/Summary-of-Treasurys-Distribution-Analysis.pdf.  In fact, 
the Department estimates that windfall profits are mostly earned by the top one 
percent of earners.  See Julie Anne Cronin et al., Distributing the Corporate 
Income Tax: Revised U.S. Treasury Methodology, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 239, 256 
(2013) (“Families in the top 1 percent of the income distribution receive 51.2 
percent of corporate supernormal capital income [windfall profits], 64.3 percent 
of non-corporate supernormal capital income, and 45.6 percent of normal capital 
income.”). 
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of corporate rents, and that U.S. workers captured some rents in the 
past.358 Granted, U.S. labor is vastly less powerful than it used to be and 
than it is in Europe today. But the possibility of rent-sharing remains. 
Indeed, the most recent analysis suggests that U.S. workers get roughly 
one half of significant rents captured by U.S. firms.359 Here too, however, 
high-skill workers do much better than low-skill ones.360 
There is no doubt that distributional projections are more complex 
and less precise than the forecasts of the standard economic indicators. 
But it is a mistake to use this comparison as a justification for not making 
distributional adjustments. That is because the uncertainty about 
common economic forecasts is great as well. Great enough, that is, for 
the forecasters to be wrong time and again. 
Start at the top, with the U.S. Congress. It has a knack for trying to 
regulate behavior through the tax code. In 1993, for example, it decided 
to deny a compensation deduction for any payment to a corporate 
executive in excess of one million dollars unless the payment was 
performance-based.361 
Congress being a collective body, it is difficult to attribute to it a 
single purpose for enacting the rule. One goal was to limit executive 
pay—a prominent issue during the 1992 presidential election.362 “The 
committee believes that excessive compensation will be reduced if the 
deduction for compensation (other than performance-based 
compensation) paid to the top executives of publicly held corporations is 
                                                      
358 See Emmanuel Saez et al., Payroll Taxes, Firm Behavior, and Rent 
Sharing: Evidence form a Young Workers’ Tax Cut in Sweden, 109 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1717, 1717 (2019); see also Farber et al., supra note, at 5 (summarizing 
the literature); Furman & Orszag, supra note 328, at 2, 37-38 (offering rent-
sharing between suppliers of capital and labor as a possible explanation for rise 
of inequality and decline in labor mobility, citing research showing the existence 
of such rent sharing in the U.S. in the 1970s). 
359 See Thibaut Lamadon et al., Imperfect Competition, Compensating 
Differentials and Rent Sharing in the U.S. Labor Market 48 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25954, 2019), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w25954. 
360 See id. at 50. 
361 See H.R.2264, Pub. L. No. 103-66 (adding section 162(m) to the Internal 
Revenue Code). 
362 See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are and How 
We Got There, in 2 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 211, 277-79 
(George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2013) (reporting statements of several 
presidential aspirants, including Bill Clinton). 
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limited to $1 million per year,” the House Report explained.363 What 
followed, however, was the exact opposite of what Congress intended to 
achieve. One million in cash became a floor—not a ceiling—for any self-
respecting executive.364 Congress’ failure of imagination did not stop it 
from attempting to impose a similar restriction twenty five years later 
(this time on tax-exempt organizations) while expecting a different 
result.365 
An alternative justification for the 1993 limitation on executive 
compensation was to improve corporate governance by tying executive 
pay, no matter how high, to the company’s performance.366 That, too, did 
not happen.367 Or, perhaps, the 1993 limitation aimed to give 
shareholders more power over corporate boards. Alas, that did not occur 
either.368 
Perhaps Congress is not the best example of forecast failures. Maybe 
some senators and representatives knew all along that the one million 
restriction and “performance-based” rules would improve nothing. 
Maybe these legislators were happy to indulge their naïve colleagues in 
their confused efforts. What about the Federal Reserve—a non-partisan 
assembly of economic experts? 
                                                      
363 H.R. Rep. 103-111 at 646. 
364 “[T]he pay trend … makes it look as if [162(m)] were passed with the 
intention of accelerating, not curbing, CEO pay increases.” CEO Compensation: 
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 108th Cong. 
(2003) (statement of Brian Hall). “[W]hile there is some evidence that 
companies paying base salaries in excess of $1 million lowered salaries to $1 
million following the enactment of Section 162(m), many others raised salaries 
that were below $1 million to exactly $1 million.” Murphy, supra note 362, at 
278-79 (internal references omitted). 
365 See H.R. Rep. 115-409, at 333 (2017) (expanding the excise tax on 
compensation in excess of $1 million to apply to tax-exempt organizations). The 
House Ways and Means Committee cited in support of the measure its belief 
“that excessive compensation … diverts resources from those particular 
purposes” that Congress aimed to encourage by granting the tax-exempt status. 
Id. Lesson not learned. 
366 See Executive Compensation, Hearing on S. 1198, H.R. 4727, and H.R. 
5260 before the Subcomm. on Taxation of the S. Comm. on Finance, 102 Cong. 
(1992) (Opening Statement of Hon. David L. Boren, Senator from Oklahoma 
and Chairman of the Subcommittee). 
367 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 121-
43 (2004) (explaining why even stock options generally viewed as performance-
based compensation and treated as such by the tax code in fact bear only a weak 
relationship to corporate success). 
368 See id. at 196-97. 
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Benn Steil, a monetary economist and an astute observer of the Fed, 
recently summarized the results of the Fed’s forecasts: 
The Fed started publishing the Board of Governors’ 
and Reserve Banks’ three-year forecasts in October 
2007. At that time, the GDP growth forecasts among this 
group of 17 ranged from 2.2% to 2.7%. Actual 2010 
GDP growth was 3%, outside the Fed's range. 
The Fed forecasters told us that unemployment in 
2010 would be in a range between 4.6% and 5%. In fact, 
it averaged about twice that, or 9.6%. The forecasters 
further predicted that both Personal Consumption 
Expenditures inflation (PCE, similar to CPI) and core 
PCE inflation would be in a range from 1.5% and 2%. 
The former came in at 1.3% and the latter at 1%, again 
outside the Fed’s range. The Fed’s scorecard on its 2007 
three-year forecasts: 0 for 4. 
In short, the Fed’s premise that it can speak with 
authority about the future is flawed. During the two 
decades [ending in] 2006, its own experts were worse 
than outside ones in predicting one-year economic data. 
Since the start of the crisis in 2007, its three-year 
predictions have been worthless.369 
To the Fed’s credit, it is cutting back on its forecasting business. But 
this retrenchment took some time, dismal results notwithstanding.370 
Or consider another non-partisan expert body—the CBO. Its success 
in projecting budgetary costs of various programs is decidedly mixed. 
Some of its projections were remarkably accurate. For instance, the 
CBO’s forecast of the unemployment benefits under the Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation program was just five percent off.371 But 
the CBO predictions of the revenue brought by spectrum auctions missed 
                                                      
369 Benn Steil, Why We Can’t Believe the Fed, WALL ST. J. (Feb 22, 2012), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204652904577197010637908
348. 
370 See Benn Steil & Benjamin Della Rocca, The Fed Finally Unties Its Own 
Hands, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-fed-
finally-unties-its-own-hands-1540247559. 
371 See Doug Elmendorf, The Accuracy of CBO’s Budget Projections (Mar. 
25, 2013), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/44017.  
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the mark by thirty percent—in both directions on various occasions.372 
The CBO was off by thirty five percent estimating the cost of Medicare 
Part D (the Administration’s estimates were even more flawed).373 And it 
understated the decline in corporate tax revenues in the wake of the 2017 
tax reform by a factor of two.374 Needless to say, the CBO has not 
stopped producing estimates, and Congress has not stopped passing 
budgets based on them. 
It is all but inevitable that distributional projections will be sometimes 
mistaken even if they are based on the most sophisticated econometric 
techniques and are constantly reviewed and revised. Yet these mistakes 
will be neither unique nor unfamiliar. Similar mistakes happen time and 
again when Congress, the Federal Reserve, other agencies, and numerous 
state legislatures adopt policies based on imperfect forecasts of future 
productivity, employment, interest rates, economic growth, and so on. 
And just as all those policies continue despite prior misses and even 
occasional failures of the underlying forecasts, so should the 
distributional projections and distributional adjustments become the 
standard part of policymakers’ toolkit. 
The final point is that the implications of emphasizing distributional 
uncertainty are decidedly one-sided. I am not aware of a single major 
policy enacted in the past four decades that over-compensated 
distributional losers because the proper level of compensation was so 
difficult to ascertain. Instead, distributional uncertainty is inevitably used 
to justify under-compensating those who bear disproportionate costs. 
These asymmetric results ought to loom large in evaluating calls for 
inaction in light of distributional uncertainty. 
B. Distributional Impacts Take Too Long to Reveal 
Themselves  
Another objection emphasizes not uncertainty but time. Distributional 
impacts take so long to reveal themselves in the data, the objection goes, 
                                                      
372 See id. 
373 See id. 
374 See Brian Faler, Big Business Paying Even less Than Expected Under 
GOP Tax Law, POLITICO (June 13, 2019) (reporting that corporate tax revenue 
in 2018 experienced “almost twice the decline official budget forecasters had 
predicted”), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/13/big-businesses-pay-less-
tax-law-1364591. 
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that the government would be reacting to yesterday’s (or, more precisely, 
years’-old) news if it tries to respond to distributional impacts when it 
discovers them.  
This objection doubles as an explanation for the U.S. government’s 
failure to address the unintended distributional burdens of its policies for 
decades. But as recent research shows, the troubling distributional effects 
of the policies discussed in Part III—or at least major red flags 
suggesting these effects—could have been discovered a decade or two 
ago. 
Consider labor mobility once again. The key assumption of trade 
economists in the 1990’s was that distributional effects of trade are 
minor because U.S. workers are highly mobile. Labor mobility is also 
key for the analysis of the monopsony power in labor markets. If workers 
can pick up and leave any place that has only a few employers trying to 
hold down wages, wages will equilibrate nationwide and no employer 
would be able to exert market power. A similar analysis applies to the 
geographically concentrated costs of environmental regulation. Clearly, 
labor mobility is very important for distributional outcomes. 
 
 
Figure 1. Share of U.S. residents who moved during the past year, 1947-
2016.375 
Figure 1 shows how Americans moved in the past seven decades. The 
decline is dramatic. Between 1945 and 1965 about twenty percent of 
U.S. residents moved during any previous year. By 2015 that share 
                                                      
375 The figure appears in ADDRESSING AMERICA’S RESKILLING CHALLENGE, 
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS 5 (2018). 
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dropped almost by half. As importantly for our purposes, this decline is 
not recent. It started in 1960s, briefly reversed in mid-1980s, and 
continued without interruption since then.376 Maybe economists looking 
at Figure 1 in early 1990s would not have seen a cause for concern. But 
by 2000 the decline would have been impossible to ignore. Economists, 
it appears, simply did not look for some time. 
Now consider the evidence of offshoring—American jobs leaving 
abroad. Figure 2 shows the trends in employment of U.S. and foreign 
workers by multinational firms. Note that these trends do not show all 
offshoring job losses. If GM moved a plant from Michigan to its 
Mexican subsidiary, Figure 2 reflects the change. But if Magnavox’ U.S. 
TV manufacturing simply disappeared while Samsung’s South Korean 
production revved up, the resulting American job losses would be in 
addition to those depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Trends in domestic and affiliate employment among 
multinational firms.377 
                                                      
376 See Benmelech et al., supra note 134, at 2; De Loecker & Eeckhout, 
supra note 184, at 27-28. 
377 Figure 2 appears in Avraham Ebenstein et al., Estimating the Impact of 
Trade and Offshoring on American Workers Using the Current Population 
Surveys, 96 REV. ECON. STAT. 581, 586 (2014). 
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One does not need a Ph.D. in economics to see that by mid-1990s the 
trend was as clear as it was disturbing. Yet first empirical work 
investigating the distributional consequences of NAFTA and the China 
shock did not appear until 2010.378 (Note that “low-income 
employment”—the rising line in Figure 2—refers to employment in low-
income countries, not U.S. employment of low-income workers.) 
The point is certainly not that trade economists missed some obvious 
changes in the economy. There are many ways to slice the data and look 
at employment. Just in 2016, Justin Pierce and Peter Schott published an 
article in the leading economics journal focused on the “surprisingly 
swift decline of U.S. manufacturing employment” after 2000.379 Yet the 
U.S. manufacturing employment at multinational firms has been 
declining for a long time, as is clear from Figure 2. If that figure could be 
produced in 2010,380 a similar figure could have been produced in 1998. 
And if it were produced then, alarm bells would have probably started 
ringing twenty years ago. 
One could have looked at import exposure of U.S. manufacturing 
industries as well, as German Gutiérrez and Thomas Philippon recently 
did.381 Again, the trend depicted in Figure 3 was clear by 2000, even if 
not as dramatic as it became afterwards. 
                                                      
378 The sole working paper revealing distributional effects of NAFTA that 
was later published as Hakobyan & McLaren, supra note 83, was available at 
least as early as 2010. See John McLaren & Shushanik Hakobyan, Looking for 
Local Labor Market Effects of NAFTA (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 16535, 2010), https://www.nber.org/papers/w16535. An 
early draft of the China Syndrome, supra note 86, was available at least as early 
as 2011, http://economics.mit.edu/files/7723. China Syndrome was the first 
study showing the impact of the China Shock. See Goldberg, supra note 76, at 7. 
379 Pierce & Schott, supra note 86. 
380 The draft version of this article was available at least as early as 2010. See 
Autor et al., China Syndrome, supra note 86, at 2167 (citing the 2010 working 
paper later published as Ebenstein et al., supra note 377). 
381 See Gutiérrez & Philippon, supra note 284, at 15. 
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Figure 3. Import exposure for manufacturing industries. 
Turning to the growing evidence of product market concentration, 
Figure 4 shows the rise in markups during the past several decades. If 
economists looked at this data in 1990, they probably would have taken 
notice. By 2000 they would have seen a clear red flag. The paper 
reporting this data is was published in 2020. 
 
Figure 4. The evolution of average markups from 1955 to 2016.382 
Now consider the rise of monopsony power in labor markets caused 
by the small number of employers in American heartland. As is clear 
                                                      
382 The figure comes from De Loecker et al., supra note 111, at 575. 
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from Figure 5, here too the alarming trend has emerged by early 2000’s. 
Here too the trend remained undetected until now. 
 
Figure 5. Trends in average local-level employment concentration, 1977-
2009.383 
Observing the timing of all these trends, one has to agree with one of 
the leading trade economists, Gordon Hanson.  Explaining to the New 
York Times corresponded who was trying to understand why voters 
supporting candidate Donald Trump’s protectionist policies seemed to 
have discovered the devastating effects of trade liberalization before the 
economists did, Hanson confessed that “it took a while for academics to 
catch up.”384 Now that economists have done so, policymakers will have 
much more timely data about distributional impacts, enabling them to 
respond with policy adjustments if they choose to do so.385 
C. Fiscal Federalism 
This Article urges greater national uniformity to alleviate the 
geographically uneven burdens of free trade, labor market concentration, 
environmental regulation, and so on.  Greater national uniformity stands 
in obvious tension with local experimentation. As various scholars 
                                                      
383 Figure 6 comes from Benmelech et al., supra note 134, at 28. 
384 Nelson D. Schwartz & Quoctrung Bui, Where Jobs Are Squeezed by 
Chinese Trade, Voters Seek Extremes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2016), 
https://nyti.ms/1Ta9XDj. Hanson was commenting on the effects of the China 
shock on the U.S. economy. 
385 Indeed, a flurry of research findings discussed in the Conclusion offers 
strongly supports this conjecture. 
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pointed out, this experimentation may lead to more efficient local 
government that emerges from inter-governmental competition to attract 
more (and more affluent) residents, greater ability of residents to choose 
among various packages of local amenities, fewer governmental 
intrusions into operation of the markets, greater accountability of local 
officials, and may serve as a check on abuse of power at the federal 
level.386 
All these arguments have counterarguments, and this Article does not 
attempt to resolve the long-standing debates about federalism in general 
and fiscal federalism in particular. The Article’s contribution to this 
debate, however, is to highlight a growing body of empirical research 
that points strongly in the same direction. Highly variable social safety 
net as well as high and growing state-created barriers to entry exacerbate 
and prolong the economic suffering resulting from major federal policies 
discussed in this Article. This evidence should weigh heavily in 
policymakers’ balancing of costs and benefits of greater national 
uniformity. 
CONCLUSION 
Along with the rest of the world, the United States is facing two 
profound challenges. First, the country needs to find a medical solution 
to a global pandemic. Second, and as important, the country needs to find 
an economic solution to the pandemic’s consequences. 
Sadly, but not surprisingly, the emerging evidence reveals that these 
consequences have much in common with those described in this Article. 
Again, it is low-skill, low-wage workers who are bearing the brunt of the 
economic contraction caused by the spread of COVID-19.387 Again, the 
                                                      
386 For a discussion of these arguments and references to a large literature, 
see, e.g., Galle & Leahy, supra note 29, at 1335-37; Wallace E. Oates, Toward A 
Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism, 12 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 349, 
350-51 (2005); Super, supra note 29, at 2556-60.  
387 “Workers in occupations that are more likely to be affected by social 
distancing policies are workers [who are] more economically vulnerable.” 
Simon Mongey et al., Which Workers Bear the Burden of Social Distancing 
Policies? 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 27085, 2020), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w27085. See also Alexander W. Bartik et al., 
Measuring the Labor Market at the Onset of the COVID-19 Crisis 15-16 
(Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2020), available at  
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Bartik-et-al-
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burdens are concentrated geographically, making low mobility of low-
skill workers particularly costly.388 Given these similarities, the policies 
advocated in this Article—broad-based transitional assistance, stronger 
and nationally uniform social safety net, and some distributionally-
informed legal rules—are precisely the ones needed to help vulnerable 
Americans (and the country as a whole) to recover from the economic 
devastation of the pandemic.389 
Yet it is by no means clear that the government will pursue these 
programs after the emergency cash infusions into the economy inevitably 
come to an end. Nor is it the case that academics have developed widely 
shared views about how to design, implement, evaluate, and improve 
distributional policies. 
The two distributional arguments may well be part of the reason for 
this unfortunate state of affairs. Global pandemics happen rarely, as do 
major financial crises like the Great Depression or the Great Recession. 
In contrast, legal rules change more often, including the major changes 
like those described in this Article. These relatively frequent changes, 
                                                                                                                         
conference-draft.pdf (finding that economic contraction caused by COVID-19 
disproportionately affected low-wage, low-education workers); Tomaz Cajner et 
al., The U.S. Labor Market During the Beginning of the Pandemic Recession 11-
12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 27159, 2020), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w27159  (finding that the “employment losses 
during the Pandemic Recession are disproportionately concentrated among low 
wage workers); Raj Chetty et al., How Did COVID-19 and Stabilization Policies 
Affect Spending and Employment? A New Real-Time Economic Tracker Based 
on Private Sector Data 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
27431, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27431 (finding that low-wage 
hourly workers were especially likely to lose jobs and that job postings fell more 
sharply for low-skill positions). 
388 See Jose Maria Barrero et al., COVID-19 Is Also a Reallocation Shock, 3, 
24-25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 27137, 2020), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w27137 (suggesting that occupational licensing 
restrictions that significantly “impede mobility across occupations and states” 
are likely to be among major reasons likely to “retard … responses to the 
pandemic-induced reallocation shock”);  Chetty et al., supra note 387, at 3-4 
(finding that while fewer than 30% of workers employed by small businesses 
were laid off in lowest-rent ZIP codes, that number exceeded 65% in the 
highest-rent ZIP codes, and emphasizing that “prior work shows that geography 
plays a central role in the impacts of economic shocks due to low rates of 
migration”). 
389 Others agree. See, e.g., Chetty et al., supra note 387, at 5-6 (emphasizing 
the need for stronger social insurance and targeted assistance for low-income 
individuals in areas that have suffered the largest losses). 
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and the new economic burdens they bring, offer scholars plenty of 
chances to focus on designing and refining the types of programs that 
this Article advocates. No doubt, some of that work was being done all 
along.390 But it is easy to imagine that more would have been done if 
scholars working on these issues did not feel compelled to articulate 
reasons why any distributional adjustments should be made in the first 
place before considering what these adjustments should be.391 If the two 
distributional arguments were not viewed as the default guides for 
practical policymaking, perhaps academics would have been more 
prepared today to offer concrete policy solutions as a global pandemic 
made the need for these solutions both obvious and urgent. 
This Article shows that the core assumptions of the efficiency-only 
and no-compensation arguments are implausible. Evidence for this 
conclusion comes not from a few isolated reforms or several modest 
distributional shifts. Rather, major changes in U.S. economy facilitated 
by many government policies likely produced distributional burdens that 
the arguments either dismiss or assume away. As general guides for real-
world governance, the two distributional argument do not survive a 
reality check. 
If so, perhaps the conversation should move on. We should keep in 
mind the powerful logic of the two distributional arguments, and we 
should take seriously the arguments’ well-known implications where 
appropriate. But as a general matter, we should remember that the core 
assumptions of the two arguments do not hold and their standard policy 
prescriptions do not follow. So those who have relied on the two 
arguments to support a view favoring limited government involvement in 
distributional outcomes should now look elsewhere for analytical 
support. And those who viewed the two arguments as conceptual 
obstacles to a more distributionally-sensitive and egalitarian social and 
economic agenda should realize that when the two arguments are 
retrofitted with realistic assumptions, they support this agenda, not 
oppose it. 
                                                      
390 See supra, note 352. 
391 As recently as in 2018, Richard Revesz felt that he had to devote a 
substantial part of his article to explaining why the efficiency-only argument 
does not hold for environmental, health, and safety regulation. See Revesz, 
supra note 17, at 1511-25. 
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